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Abstract: This paper uses data from the Luxembourg Income Study to examine some of the forces 
that have driven changes in household income inequality over the last three decades of the 20th 
century. We decompose inequality for 6 countries (Canada, Germany, Norway, Sweden, the UK, 
and the US) into the three sources of market income (earnings, property income and income from 
self-employment) and taxes and transfers. Our findings indicate that although changes in the 
distribution of earnings are an important force behind recent trends, they are not the only one. 
Greater earnings dispersion has in some cases been accompanied by a reduction in the share of 
earnings which dampened its impact on overall household income inequality. In some countries the 
contribution of self-employment income to inequality has been on the rise, while in others, 
increases in inequality in capital income account for a substantial fraction of the observed 
distributional changes.  
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 1. Introduction  
The extent to which different sources of income influence overall income inequality across 
households has interested economists for several decades.1 One of the problems of this type of 
research is the fact that because income concepts vary across national surveys, most existing studies 
deal with a single country. In this paper, we exploit the data collected by the Luxemburg Income 
Study in order to decompose income inequality into its factor components for six countries over a 
35-year period. 
 A number of industrial countries have experienced an increase in household income 
inequality in the last decades of the 20th century. At the same time, they have also witnessed an 
increase in earnings dispersion.2 By decomposing inequality by factor sources we can assess 
whether increased earnings dispersion has been the only culprit for observed income inequality 
trends, or whether other factors have also contributed to the changing distribution of income. 
Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) find that in a number of countries increased earnings dispersion 
was not accompanied by increased household income inequality, and there are indications in the 
literature that other factors have been important. Notably, Jenkins (1995) finds that both changes in 
the distribution of capital income and self-employment income contributed to the increase in 
income inequality in the UK in the first half of the 1980s. The availability of new data allows us to 
examine whether these trends have persisted or if they were only a temporary feature. Moreover, by 
comparing six economies we address the question of whether such patterns have been restricted to 
the UK or part of a more general phenomenon present also in other countries.  
 The second aspect on which we focus is the age composition of the population and the 
differences in inequality across age groups. There are two reasons why a decomposition by age can 
help us understand the forces that drive inequality changes. First, we want to understand the role of 
capital income inequality. High inequality in this factor can be due to two effects. One possibility is 
that it is the result of an unequal distribution of wealth for all age groups. Alternatively, it may be 
caused by life-cycle savings, in which case the data should show that capital income inequality is 
mainly due to differences across age groups and not within age groups. Moreover, if life cycle 
considerations were the main cause of wealth inequality we should also observe important 
differences across countries. In countries with generous public pension systems, old individuals 
would tend to live off state pensions rather than their own savings, and hence we would expect to 
observe less inequality in the distribution of capital incomes. Second, a number of papers examining 
the recent increase in earnings dispersion have shown that, at least in the US and the UK, greater 
                                                 
1 See, amongst others, Fei et al. (1978), Fields (1979), Pyatt et al. (1980), Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), Shorrocks 
(1983), Podder (1993), Jenkins (1995). 
2 See Atkinson (1997), Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Acemoglu (2003), and Lemieux (2008). 
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wage dispersion has been partly the result of increased returns to experience.3 Our analysis can then 
help understand to what extent the increase in overall earnings inequality across households is due 
to the fact that older individuals now receive higher wages. Existing work -such as Cowell and 
Jenkins (1995), Jenkins (1995), and Jäntti (1997)- has found that inequality across age groups has 
little explanatory power, but this could be due to the short time periods considered. Here we 
examine whether this result still holds over the substantially longer period that we analyse. 
The paper closest to our analysis is Jäntti (1997), who uses data from the Luxembourg 
Income Study for five countries -Canada, the Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom and United 
States- and has two observations, one for the early and one for the late 1980s. He concludes that the 
increase in household income inequality that took place in Sweden, the UK and the US during the 
period was mainly due to an increase in labour earnings inequality. We extend the work of Jäntti in 
two dimensions. First, we consider a longer time period. The increase in available data is 
significant: our sample includes 6 countries, and we have at best eight observations per country, 
going from 1969/1970 to 2004/05. This implies a substantially longer period of study, and allows us 
to assess to what extent the increases in inequality observed in the 1980s have continued or been 
reversed. Second, although Jäntti performs decompositions both by factors and by household 
characteristics such as age, these decompositions are performed separately. In contrast, we nest the 
decompositions by factors and by age. This allows us to examine not only whether the incomes of 
the young are more or less unequal than those of the old, but also which factors have generated the 
observed differences across age groups. Brandolini and Smeeding (2009) also perform factor 
decompositions for a number of countries, but they focus on one year (2000 or thereabouts) thus 
abstracting from the evolution over time. Their results, like ours, highlight important cross-country 
differences in the contribution of the various factors to overall household income inequality.      
Methodologically, we follow a large literature that has performed decompositions of an 
inequality index into a within-group and between-group component; see, for instance, Mookherjee 
and Shorrocks (1982), Karoly (1992), Parker (1999), Brandolini and D’Alessio (2001). However, 
there are only a few studies that perform both decompositions across groups and factors. As well as 
Jenkins (1995) and Jäntti (1997), this approach has been taken by Fluckiger and Silber (1995), 
Achdut (1996) and Drescher (1999), who focus, respectively, on Switzerland, Israel and Denmark, 
all of them countries that are not included in our sample. These papers consider either the factor 
decomposition or the decomposition by age (or other characteristics). In contrast, we decompose 
inequality using a nested approach that allows us to differentiate the contribution of various factors 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997), Machin (1996), and Machin and Van Reenen (1998). 
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to inequality within each age group.4 Some recent work, such as Jenkins and van Kerm (2005), 
proposes as an alternative density function decompositions that allow a richer analysis of 
distributional changes at all points of the distribution. This method has the advantage of being 
independent of the choice of inequality index, but does not provide summary measures of the 
decomposition, making cross-country comparisons cumbersome. 
Our results indicate that the stability of the share of earnings in household income in the US 
is remarkable when compared to the experience of other countries. The share of earnings fell 
sharply in the other Anglo-Saxon economies, dropping by 5 percentage points in the UK and by 6 
in Canada over the period 1974/75 to 2004, and fell by between 6 and 12 points in the continental 
economies. As a result, although all countries in our sample experienced an increase in earnings 
inequality, the contribution of this source of income to overall inequality sometimes remained 
unchanged due to a reduction in the earnings share. The share of different factors also fluctuates 
over time. Consider, for example, the UK over the period 1979-2004: the share of earnings fell 
steadily, that of self-employment income grew from 6 to 10 percent, while that of capital income 
first increased and then decreased. Our decompositions indicate that these movements in factor 
shares have been a key determinant of the evolution of inequality amongst British households.5 
The contribution of different factors to overall inequality varies sharply across countries. 
That of earnings accounted, in 2004, for as much as 120% in the US and as little as 95% in 
Germany and Norway, where both capital and self-employment income make large contributions.6 
In the UK and Canada the contribution of self-employment income to overall inequality has been on 
the rise, while greater inequality in income from property is crucial in explaining the experience of 
the Scandinavian economies. These results indicate the difficulty in generalizing the causes of 
distributional changes even within a relatively homogeneous group of countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the data and discusses 
some of the explanations for observed changes in inequality. We then present the decomposition 
rule of our inequality measure, the half  squared coefficient of variation, into factor components and 
population groups. Sections 4 and 5 present the results of the decomposition of the inequality index, 
examining first decompositions by factor and subsequently the nested decompositions by age-
groups and factor. We then turn to the decomposition of earnings, and conclude in section 7. 
 
                                                 
4 See Mussard (2004) and Giammatteo (2007) for analyses of nested decompositions. 
5 See Nolan (1987) for an early discussion of how cyclical fluctuations have affected factor shares and income 
inequality in the UK.  
6 Because we are decomposing disposable income, the tax-transfer component makes a negative contribution to overall 
inequality and hence the contributions of the three market incomes adds up to over 100 percent; see below.  
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2. Trends in income inequality 
2.1 The data 
The source of our data is the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The Luxembourg Income Study is a 
project started in 1983 by researchers in several European and American countries in order to 
collect income, demographic, labour market and expenditure information at the micro-economic 
level in a way that is consistent across countries. Surveys are conducted every few years, and the 
number of member countries has expanded over time, with the project now covering 32 countries. 
As is well known, the data on income inequality are problematic and international comparisons 
difficult (see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001). Although some differences in methodology remain, 
LIS provides the best existing data on inequality in terms of cross-country consistency.7 
Our choice of countries has been largely driven by data availability and comparability. Our 
initial intention was to look at three groups: three Anglo-Saxon countries (US, UK, and Canada), 
the large continental European economies (France, Germany, and Italy), and the Scandinavian 
economies (Sweden and Norway). Differences in the degree of inequality across these groups are 
well documented (see, for example, Brandolini and Smeeding, 2008) and the aim of our 
decomposition is to look at these differences from an alternative perspective. Unfortunately, the 
only measure of earnings available for France and Italy are net earnings, implying, on the one hand, 
that the results on the contribution of this factor would capture both changes in the underlying 
distribution of earnings and in taxes, and, on the other, that the results would not be directly 
comparable with those on gross earnings obtained for other countries. We hence decided to remove 
France and Italy from our sample and focus on the remaining six countries.  
Details on the data are provided in the Appendix. The number of observations varies across 
countries, depending on the number and frequency of surveys, with countries having between 5 and 
9 observations spread over the period. The data range between 1969 and 2005, starting in 1969/71 
for the UK and Canada, in the mid-70s for the US and the Scandinavian economies, and in 1984 for 
Germany.8 
Our income concept is household disposable income. We consider four sources of income: 
earnings, capital income, self-employment income, and a residual category that we term “taxes and 
transfers”. The fourth term consists mainly of direct taxes, public pensions, and government 
transfers such as unemployment benefit or child benefit, but includes also private transfers such as 
                                                 
7 One problem of the LIS data is that since they are collected every few years, a particular year could be an outlier. We 
compared the patterns that we obtain with LIS to annual time series reported by Brandolini and Smeeding (2008) for all 
countries in our sample except Norway and found no reason for concern.  
8 LIS has data for the US in 1969. Unfortunately only gross incomes are available for that year. We have performed the 
decomposition also for this category going back to 1969 for the US, and the results are available upon request.  
 6
alimony payments. We would have liked to separate public pensions from the remaining sources of 
income, but for many countries they are not reported separately. Hence, in order to make our results 
comparable across countries, we grouped pensions with other income even when the information 
was available.  
Cross-country comparisons of inequality use equivalence scales in order to obtain a better 
proxy for the welfare of the household than that provided by unadjusted household income. Because 
our main interest is the effect of changes in aggregate factor shares, rather than obtaining welfare 
comparisons on which there is a large literature, we have decided not to use equivalence scales. If 
we were to adjust income by the size of the household, the resulting factor shares would have no 
clear interpretation since they would not correspond to the factor shares obtained by aggregating 
each income category. Without the adjustment, the resulting factor shares have a straightforward 
interpretation: they are simply the share of each factor in average household income. It is important 
to note that, consequently, our decompositions are not directly comparable with those that use 
equivalence scales, such as Jenkins (1995). 
 
2.2. Inequality trends 
Figure 1 presents the evolution of inequality of disposable income, measured by the squared 
coefficient of variation, in the 6 countries we consider. The data show the well-documented pattern 
that inequality is highest in the Anglo-Saxon economies and lowest in Scandinavian countries, with 
the large European economies being somewhere in between. Note, nevertheless that there have been 
large fluctuations. In the 1970s the SCV in the UK (and also the Gini coefficient; see figure 2) was 
roughly the same as those observed in the Scandinavian economies. When we compare Germany 
with the two Scandinavian economies, the data indicates that although the latter exhibited lower 
inequality in the 1980s, by the end of the period this was no longer the case. We observe the trends 
that have been widely discussed by the literature, such as the increase in household income 
inequality in the US and the UK. In contrast, Canada exhibits a U-shaped pattern, with little change 
in the 1980s and 1990s. An increase in income inequality is also apparent for the Scandinavian 
countries, while the German data indicate a rather flat time trend.  
 Since most cross-country comparisons of inequality use the Gini coefficient, figure 2 reports 
the Gini coefficients we obtained from the LIS data. Our definition of income is, as before, 
disposable household income. The ranking of countries in terms of the Gini coefficient and 
observed time trends reproduce those obtained with the SCV. The two measures indicate, 
nevertheless, differences in the timing, notably for the US where the Gini coefficient peaked in the 
mid-1990s while the SCV kept increasing till 2000. Because the Gini coefficient places less weight 
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at the extremes of the distribution, this difference is likely due to changes at the top or bottom of the 
distribution.9 
 
2.3. What may drive changes in inequality? 
There are three main reasons why the distribution of household income may change: changes in 
market incomes, such as earnings or income from property; a different demographic structure; and 
changes in tax and transfer policies.  In what follows, we have chosen to concentrate on the first two 
effects. The first question we want to address is to what extent different sources of market income 
have driven inequality changes. Market income may come from three sources: earnings, self-
employment income, and capital income. The increase in earnings inequality has been well 
documented,10 although there has been little work examining to what extent changes in the 
distribution of individual earnings drive changes in the distribution of household income. A notable 
exception is Gottschalk and Danziger (2005), who examine the evolution of hourly wage rates and 
household income inequality in the US.11 One of our objectives is to quantify the extent to which 
earnings inequality has been the culprit for the observed increase in household income inequality.  
Although earnings are the largest source of household income in all countries, changes in 
income from self-employment and property can also play a major role. Jenkins (1995) identified a 
substantial contribution of self-employment income to the increase in inequality in the UK in the 
first half of the 1980s. Since we can use data for a longer period, we will be able to assess whether 
the increased contribution of self-employment has continued, and whether this phenomenon also 
took place in other countries. The early 1980s also witnessed a sharp rise in the contribution of 
property income to overall inequality. There are three elements that may have contributed to this: 
changes in the labour and capital shares in overall income, changes in the rate of return, and 
changes in taxation that may have favoured property income. One possibility is that the changes in 
property income inequality in the 1980s were the result of the high interest rates that prevailed at 
the time, rather than of an increase in the concentration of wealth. If this were the case, we would 
expect that the subsequent reduction in interest rates caused a reduction both in the share of 
property income in total household income and in its dispersion. Moreover, if it were high interest 
rates that drove the increase in capital income inequality in the UK, we should observe a similar 
increase in the other countries in our sample.  
                                                 
9 See Atkinson and Piketty (2007) for a discussion of the evolution of top incomes in industrial countries over the 20th 
century and Piketty and Saez (2003) for the US. 
10 See Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and Atkinson (2007, 2008b). 
11 See also Gottschalk (1997) and Checchi and García-Peñalosa (2008, 2010) on the relationship between wage 
inequality and household income inequality. 
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 The second aspect on which we focus is the age composition of the population and the 
differences in inequality across age groups. There are two main reasons why a decomposition by 
age can help us understand the forces that drive inequality changes. First, we want to understand the 
role of capital income inequality. High inequality in this factor can be due to two reasons. One 
possibility is that it is the result of an unequal distribution of wealth for any age group. 
Alternatively, it may be caused by life-cycle savings, in which case the data should show that 
capital income inequality is mainly due to differences across and not within age groups. Moreover, 
if life cycle considerations were the main cause of wealth inequality we should also observe 
important differences across countries. In countries with generous public pension systems, old 
individuals would tend to live off state pensions rather than their own savings, and hence we should 
observe less inequality in the distribution of capital incomes across age groups. Second, the 
literature on the increase in earnings dispersion has shown that, at least in the US and the UK, 
greater wage dispersion has been, partly the result of increased returns to experience. This would 
imply that we should observe an increase in earnings inequality across age groups. A further 
question concerns self-employment. There is evidence that self-employment is more frequent 
amongst mature workers,12 and this too should be reflected in a greater contribution of self-
employment income to inequality for those age groups. 
 Both Jenkins (1995) and Jäntti (1997) find little role for demographic changes in their 
inequality decompositions. However, their data spans a substantially shorter period of time, with the 
former having data for a 15-year period and the latter for just under a decade. In our case the data 
covers a longer period, particularly for the UK and Canada, were we have information from 1969 to 
2004. One could hence expect that changes in the demographic composition are more pronounced 
and play a greater role in explaining inequality. 
 Lastly, since earnings are the largest component of household incomes, we also decompose 
this source according to two criteria. First, we consider what share of earnings inequality is due to a 
fraction of the population having no earnings and which to differences amongst households with 
positive earnings. This would capture the effect that both unemployment and an aging population 
(i.e. an increase in the number of retired households) have. Such decomposition is particularly 
important when looking at various countries since they may be at different stages of the business 
cycle. Second, we look at inequality in earnings for households with positive earnings and assess 
how much of it is due to greater inequality amongst household heads, to inequality amongst 
spouses, or to the correlation between the two. This decomposition is intended to capture the role of 
a higher participation of women in the labour market as well as that of their improved access to 
                                                 
12 See, for example, Evans and Leighton (1989). 
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high-paying jobs, both of which exhibited a major upward trend over the period in most countries. It 
also captures the effect of assortative matting, which Burtless (1999) finds had an important impact 
on the increase in household income inequality in the US during the 1980s and early 90s. 13    
 In order to address these questions, we decompose household disposable income into four 
categories: earnings, self-employment, capital income and tax and transfers. The first three together 
sum up to market income, and our discussion of changes in inequality will be mainly concerned 
with those. Although tax and transfer changes are a crucial aspect when examining the evolution 
over time of disposable income we will only consider the overall impact of this rather broad 
component. Discussing in detail changes in taxation and progressivity in the 6 countries under 
consideration over three decades is a major task which is beyond the scope of this paper.14 Note also 
that fiscal policy will have an indirect impact on disposable incomes, as fiscal changes induce 
reactions in factor prices and shares and through these affect market incomes.  
  
3. Inequality index decompositions   
3.1. Inequality index decompositions 
A large theoretical literature has examined possible ways of decomposing inequality indices by 
factor components, and illustrated the methodologies proposed with some empirical evidence.15  As 
is well known, different inequality indices have different merits and drawbacks. We have chosen to 
employ as our measure of inequality the squared coefficient of variation, denoted SCV, as is common 
in the empirical literature on inequality decompositions. The SCV has two key features, as compared 
to other inequality indices. The first one is that decompositions can be nested, allowing us to 
examine the changes in factor contributions by population subgroups. The second is that it is more 
sensitive to extreme values than the Gini coefficient. Although this is an argument that is often used 
to prefer the use of the latter index, it is useful when we perform decompositions by factor incomes. 
In those decompositions we find that there are many observations with zero values, notably in the 
case of self-employment and property income, and we want to use an index that is sensitive to such 
extreme values.  
                                                 
13 Breen and Salazar (2010, 2011) examine whether educational assortative matting was behind this effect, using data 
for both the US and the UK. Their results indicate that the correlation in education across household members was not a 
factor driving earnings inequality in either economy. 
14 A number of single-country studies have examined the role of the tax-transfer system. See, for example, Jenkins 
(1995) for the UK, Fjærli and Aaberge (2000) for Norway, and Björklund and Palme (2001) for Sweden.  
15 See for example Fei et al. (1978), Bourguignon (1979), Pyatt et al. (1980), Shorrocks (1982), Lerman and Yitzhaki 
(1985), and Fournier (2001).  
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The sensitivity of the index to top incomes is, however, a concern. In order to reduce this 
problem we have top-coded the data.16 Although top-coding attenuates the problem, it does not solve it 
completely. For example, Burkhauser, Feng, and Jenkins (2009) and Burkhauser, Feng, Jenkins and 
Larrimore (2011) examine in detail US data to understand to what extent inequality indices are 
sensitive to censoring and top-coding of the raw data and whether different indices imply the same 
trends over time, and their results highlight the importance of the choice of inequality measure. 
Burkhauser et al. (2011) find that the Gini coefficient and the SCV yield similar inequality trends, 
although the SCV, yields larger changes from one survey to the next, just as we saw in section 2. 
 The choice of inequality index is hence not trivial for the results. The Gini decompositions 
proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and used, for example, by Garner (1993) and Podder 
(1993), could give somewhat different results. Moreover, we could have chosen alternative 
approaches that do not rely on a single index. Some recent work, such as Jenkins and van Kerm 
(2005), proposes density function decompositions that allow a richer analysis of distributional 
changes at all points of the distribution. This method has the advantage of being independent of the 
choice of inequality index. However, because it does not provide summary measures of the 
decomposition, it would have made our cross-country comparisons cumbersome. We have hence 
opted more a more compact approach to analyzing the data, which has the cost of relying on a 
particular index. 
 
3.2. Decomposition by factors  
The half squared coefficient of variation is defined as 


















I ,    (1) 
where the population consists of n individuals indexed by i, with mean income μ  and variance 2σ . 
The income of individual i is denoted by yi, and incomes are received from various sources or factors, 
denoted by f, so that ∑ =
f
iif yy .  The population can be partitioned in J mutually exclusive age 
groups, index by j=1, …J. We can then define the inequality index for a particular factor and a 
particular group as 





σ= ,      (2) 
                                                 
16 The effect of high incomes could potentially be an important issue for LIS data since the coding of top incomes for 
some countries has changed over our sample period. We have removed observations for which gross income was more 
than 10 times the median income, which is the practice that LIS follows.  
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σ= .      (3) 
 
A number of definitions will be useful for the subsequent decompositions 
μμχ /ff ≡   factor f’s share 
fρ    correlation between factor f and total income 
nnp jj /≡   population share of group j 
μμλ /jj ≡   group j’s mean income relative to population mean 
jjfjf μμλ /≡   groups j’s mean factor-f income relative to population mean 
 
In order to analyse the impact of various income sources we follow Shorrocks (1982) and 
Jenkins (1995). A decomposable inequality index can be expressed as 
    ∑=
f
fSI       (4) 
where Sf  is the absolute contribution of factor f to overall inequality. Let ISs ff /≡  be the relative 
factor contribution, such that 1=∑
f
fs . Shorrocks makes the case for using a decomposition based on 
the point estimate of a regression of income of source f on total income, that is 
    2/),( σiiff yyCovs =  .    (5) 
It is then possible to express the absolute contributions in terms of the squared coefficient of variation 
for aggregate and factor incomes, 
   fffff IIIsS ⋅== χρ .     (6) 
 
3.3. Age-group decompositions 
There are two ways in which we can assess how the contribution of different sources of income varies 
across age groups. First, we can simply compute inequality indices by age-groups and obtain the 
contribution of different sources for each group. We can perform the factor decomposition described 
above for each age group, with the factor shares being defined by   
    jfjjfjfjf IIS ⋅= χρ      (7) 
and ∑=
f
jfj SI . The term jfS  then tells us how much of the overall inequality within-group j is due 
to inequality in incomes from factor f. 
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 Alternatively we can use a group decomposition of the inequality index. It is possible to 
express our inequality index I as   




jjj +=−+= ∑∑ 121 22 λλ   (8) 
where the first term captures inequality within age groups, wg, and the second term represents 
inequality between-groups, bg. For factor f  we can express the inequality index as 




jfjfjff bgwgpIpI +=−+= ∑∑ 121 22 λλ ,  (9) 
and using this expression we can write overall inequality as 




f bgwgSI αα ,    (10) 
with fff IS /≡α .  The term wgf  represents within-group inequality in factor f, while ff wgα  
captures the contribution of within-group inequality in factor f to overall inequality. Similarly bgf  
represents between-group inequality in factor f, and ff bgα  is the contribution of between-group 
inequality in factor f to overall inequality. This decomposition allows us to first determine the 
contribution of inequality in factor f  to overall inequality, and then assess how much of it is due to 
within-group and how much to between-group inequality.   
 
3.4. Decomposing earnings inequality 
As we will see below, earnings inequality is the largest factor component in all countries. Because of 
their importance in determining inequality, we further decompose them according to earner categories. 
Household earnings are the sum of the earnings of the household head, those of his/her spouse and 
those of other household members. As a result, an increase in earnings inequality could be due to a 
more unequal distribution of earnings across household heads, across spouses, across other members,  
or to a higher correlation across members. Moreover, a substantial fraction of households have no 
earnings (because its members are unemployed, self-employed or retired, for example), and if this 
fraction changes over time the increase in earnings inequality could reflect changes in employment 
even if the distribution of earnings amongst the employed remains unchanged. 
Let ep  be the fraction of the population with positive earnings and 
+
eI  be earnings 
inequality amongst households with positive earnings. In order to examine the role of the above 






















1    (11) 
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The first decomposition divides earnings inequality into a component due to the absence of earners, 
given by ee pp 2/)1( − , and one due to inequality amongst households with positive earnings, given 
by ee pI /
+ . Moreover, this second term can be further decomposed by obtaining the absolute 
contribution to +eI  of the earnings of the household head, the spouse and other household members. 
Defining these contributions as hS  , sS  and oS , respectively, we have oshe SSSI ++=+ . As before, 
we define the  absolute contributions as heehhh IIS ⋅= χρ , where heI  is inequality in household-
head earnings, hρ  is the correlation between household earnings and those of the household head and 
hχ  is the share of household head’s earnings in total household earnings. Equivalent expressions give 
the contributions of the two other groups. 
We can further define the relative contributions of different types of earners to overall earnings 



















pssss   (12) 
where the subscripts indicate non-earners, household head, spouse and other members, respectively. 
Obviously, the nature of these contributions is very different with that of non-earners depending 
exclusively on their share in the population (since there is no inequality within the group of non-
earners). 
 
4. Decomposition by income sources 
4.1. Absolute factor contributions 
We start by reporting the factor decomposition for the six countries in our sample, for selected years 
in tables 1, 2  and 3.17 The inequality index, the SCV, is calculated both for total disposable income 
(first column) and for its four components: earnings, self-employment income, capital income and 
tax-transfers. We then report the absolute contribution of each of these factors to overall inequality, 
that is, fS  as given by equation (6), so that the horizontal sum of factor contributions sums up to 
overall income inequality for each year. The third panel reports the share of factor f in total 
household income, fχ , as well as the share of the first three components in market income. As we will 
see, factor shares have played an important role in observed inequality changes. The bottom panel 
gives the percentage changes in inequality and the percentage changes in each source contribution, 
                                                 
17 We have chosen not to report the decomposition for all available years for all countries and give results 
(approximately) for each decade. Other country-year decompositions are available upon request. The appendix also 
reports bootstrapped results on inequality and factor contributions for selected years, and the results indicate small 
confidence intervals for our estimates. 
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where the latter are given by the expression )1/(*100* 1 −+ ftftft SSs  and the sum of the four 
components adds up to the total percentage change in inequality. Bootstrapped confidence intervals 
are reported in the appendix. 18 
Throughout our analysis, we find that disposable income inequality is lower than earnings 
inequality, which in turn is much lower than inequality in the other three factors. High levels of 
self-employment and capital-income inequality are both due to a large fraction of the population 
having no income from those sources, but also to the large inequality that prevails for those with 
positive incomes. The SCV for taxes-transfers is also large, in some cases surprisingly large (see, 
for example, the observations for the UK for 1974 and 1979 in table 1), and fluctuates sharply over 
time. The reason for this is that we have grouped together transfers and taxes, implying that a very 
large fraction of households have a negative component, which, for the richest households can be 
extremely large. Moreover, the mean varies sharply over time, being positive some years and 
negative others, probably reflecting changes in the tax-transfer system. The result is sharp 
fluctuations in the SCV of this component. Nevertheless, as we will see below, the absolute 
contribution of taxes and transfers to inequality is relatively stable over time, even in the years in 
which the SCV of taxes and transfers jumps abruptly. The other feature of the data that needs to be 
noted is that because we are looking at disposable income, the relative contribution of the first three 
components (earnings, self-employment and capital income) adds up to over one, while that of the 
fourth factor is negative, capturing the redistributive effect of taxes and transfers. 
Table 1 reports the data for the US and the UK for five dates: 1974, 1979, 1991, 1999/2000 
and 2004. The US experienced a reduction in inequality in the first decade and an increase in latter 
ones, while the SCV dropped again at the end of the period (from 0.352 to 0.319 between 2000 and 
2004). 19  The UK had an initially lower degree of inequality than the US which increased through 
to 1999, and exhibited little change between 1999 and 2004. The overall increase over 30 years was 
of 0.064 points in the US and of 0.126 in the UK, increases of 25 and 63 percent respectively, that 
lead to similar levels of inequality in both economies by the end of the period. The patterns for the 
two countries are similar in some aspects, different in others. During the 1970s both countries 
experienced a decline in the contribution of self-employment and capital income inequality, while 
the contribution of earnings inequality fell in the US and rose in the UK. As a result, overall 
inequality fell in the US but remained constant in the UK. In the US, the SCV of earnings fell 
                                                 
18 The precision of the estimates is generally very high.  
19 Similar trends appear when we look at gross income inequality. In this case we have data for the US in 1969, and we 
find that (gross income) inequality fell throughout the decade; see García-Peñalosa and Orgiazzi (2011). 
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slightly between 1974 and 1979 (from 0.473 to 0.466) while in the UK it rose by 15 percent (it had 
already started rising in 1969 with a cumulative increase of 30% over the 10 years to 1979).20 
Over the next 25 years, inequality increased in both countries, by 46 percent in the US and 
by 60 percent in the UK, with a peak in 1999/2000. As has been well documented, both countries 
witnessed a large increase in wage inequality over this period. Between 1979 and 2004, the SCV of 
earnings increased by 67 and 43 percent in the UK and in the US, respectively, and this change was 
clearly the main force driving the increase in income inequality. It is important to note that we are 
measuring the dispersion of household earnings, while most existing work on this issue uses either 
hourly wages or individual earnings. It is hence possible that some of the changes we capture are 
due to variations in the prevalence of households with no earnings or in the correlation of earnings 
across household members. We will consider this question in section 6 below.  
There are some notable differences between the UK and the US. The first concerns the 
timing: in the US, the largest increase in inequality took place in the 1990s, while in the UK it 
occurred during the 1980s. Second, self-employment income plays a much more important role in 
the UK. The contribution of self-employment to the increase in inequality between 1979 and 2004 
was of 0.065, i.e. half of the total increase, while more dispersed earnings account for almost two 
thirds of the increase (recall that, since the contribution of taxes-transfers is negative, the 
contribution of factor incomes adds up to more than 1). The large contribution of self-employment 
to rising inequality is due to the sharp rise of the share of self-employment in total household 
income. During this period, the share of earnings fell from 90 to 83 per cent while that of self-
employment income rose from 6 to 10 per cent. In contrast, in the US, the earnings share was stable 
while that for self-employment income fell by two points, implying that it tended to reduce 
inequality. In fact, increased earnings inequality accounts for virtually the entire change in the SCV 
of income, whether we look at the period 1979-2004 or 1991-2004. During the latter period we also 
observe a small reduction in the contribution of capital income and an offsetting increase in (the 
absolute value of) the contribution of taxes-transfers, both of which partly offset the increase in the 
contribution of earnings.  
Two remarks are in order concerning capital income. In both countries the capital share is 
well below those obtained from national accounts, which attribute about 60-70 percent of national 
income to labour and the rest to capital, and we will obtain the same pattern for the other economies 
in our study. Part of the answer lies in that standard estimates from national accounts define the 
labour share as the ratio of payments to employees to output and attribute the remainder to capital. 
This method of accounting ignores self-employment income, thus overstating the share of capital. 
                                                 
20 The results for UK 1969 are available on request. 
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When self-employment income is accounted for properly, the capital share falls substantially: from 
40 to 23 percent in the US and from 43 to 19 percent in the UK.21 This adjustment still leaves a 
substantial discrepancy between our capital shares and those obtained from aggregate data. There 
are various likely causes. First, a substantial fraction of the capital income generated by a firm is 
retained in order to finance future investments and hence not distributed as interest and dividends to 
households. Second, capital gains are not included in the LIS definition of capital income and hence 
not accounted for. Lastly, some under-reporting is likely given that capital incomes tend not to be 
paid in the same regular basis as wages and salaries, leading to imprecise recall. These aspects 
imply that our measures probably understate the share of capital in household incomes.  
The second comment concerns the returns to capital. As argued by van den Noord and 
Heady (2001) capital income is defined as the nominal return on capital rather than the real one, 
which should be adjusted for inflation. As a result, periods of high inflation that are accompanied by 
high nominal interest rates would yield large shares of capital income even if the real incomes 
generated by those assets were no different from those obtained in periods of low inflation and 
nominal interest rates. Unfortunately, it is not possible to correct for this problem with the available 
data.  
The contribution of tax-transfers is of similar magnitude in the US and the UK, oscillating 
between -0.06 and -0.15. Note the substantial increase in the reduction of inequality due to this 
factor in the US, which peaked in 2000 and then started declining. In the UK, this term is also of 
greater magnitude in the 1990s and 2000s than at the start of the period, indicating that in both 
countries public policy played a significant role in containing the increase in household income 
inequality. However, given the wide range of income sources included in this term, these patterns 
could reflect either changes in the extent of redistribution, or an increase in the share of pensions in 
household income associated with an aging population. In the UK, the share of this income source 
in household income rose substantially (from -3.8 per cent in 1991 to 3% in 2004) indicating that 
earlier in the period households were, on average, paying taxes while latter on they were, on 
average, receiving benefits or pensions. 
The first panel of table 2 performs the factor decomposition for Canada. As we saw earlier, 
it presents a very different pattern than the other two Anglo-Saxon economies. After a decline 
during the 1970s, inequality rose slightly after 1981, and remained stable until it experienced a 
sharp increase in 2000 (from 0.217 to 0.252). The initial decline was largely driven by changes in 
                                                 
21 See Gollin (2002, table 2); the figures refer to the 1990s. Similar changes are reported for Norway and Sweden, the 
data for Canada and Germany not being available. Gollin also discusses the fact that self-employment income is 
composed of both labour and capital income and proposes a number of alternative adjustments to compute factor shares 
that capture this fact. 
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the absolute contribution of earnings, which in turn was the result of lower earnings inequality and a 
reduction in their share. After 1981 earnings dispersion started increasing, reaching roughly the 
same level as in the US by the end of the period. However, the increase in the contribution of this 
factor was smaller than in the US due to a reduction in the share of earnings in household income. 
The contribution of self-employment income increased by two thirds over the entire period, and 
accounted for 40 percent of the increase in inequality. In contrast, the contribution of capital income 
fluctuated over the period, increasing in the 80s, falling in the next decade, and rising again at the 
end of the period, with these changes being the result of an increase in dispersion of this factor and 
a reduction in its share. As is the case in the UK, the share of taxes-transfers became positive by the 
end of the period. 
The results for Germany, reported in the second panel of table 2, are unfortunately for a 
shorter period due to data availability, going from 1984 to 2004. The SCV of disposable income 
was stable over the first 15 years and increased moderately between 2000 and 2004, being 5 percent 
higher in the latter year than in 1984. This stability hides substantial changes in factor income 
inequality. Earnings dispersion increased by more than in the US: in Germany the SCV of earnings 
went from 0.565 in 1984 to 0.706 in 2004, while in the US it increased from 0.551 to 0.668 over the 
period 1986-2004. As is the case for Canada, the share of earnings in household income is lower in 
Germany than in the US and, furthermore, it declined by 6 percentage points over the period, 
resulting in a small increase in their contribution to overall inequality of 4 percent (as compared to 
an increase of 31 per cent for the US over the same period). A reduction in the absolute value of the 
contribution of tax-transfers accounted for the other percentage point increase in overall inequality, 
while a decrease in the contribution of self-employment was offset by an increase in that of capital 
incomes increased.  
Decompositions for Norway and Sweden are reported in table 3. As discussed above, these 
two economies experienced increases in disposable income inequality although of smaller 
magnitude than those observed in the UK and the US, with the SCV increasing by 0.038 points in 
Norway and by 0.025 in Sweden between the mid/late 1970s and 2004/5. These changes were 
largely the result of a more dispersed distribution of earnings. Starting in 1979/81, the SCV of 
earnings rose by 18 and 19 percent in Norway and Sweden respectively. Although this was a 
smaller increase than that experienced by the US and the UK, by the end of the period earnings 
inequality was similar to that observed in the Anglo-Saxon economies, notable in Sweden. For 
example, in 2004 the SCV of earnings was 0.668 in the US and 0.660 in Sweden. Its contribution to 
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overall inequality is, however, much smaller in the Scandinavian economies because the share of 
earnings is about 5 percentage points lower than in the Anglo-Saxon ones.22 
There are two important differences between the two Scandinavian economies.  In Sweden, 
the increase in overall inequality that started in 1981 was mainly due to greater earnings dispersion, 
and the impact on overall inequality of this increased dispersion was partly offset by a reduction in 
the contribution of capital income. The Swedish data illustrate the importance of factor shares.  Recall 
that the contribution of factor f depends both on the SCV of that factor and on the share of the factor in 
total household income (see equation (6)). We can see from table 3 that the contribution of earnings 
was roughly the same in 1975 as in 2004, 0.251 and 0.255. However, in 1975 this was the result of 
a moderate degree of earnings dispersion (0.508) and a high earnings share (1.021) while in 2004 
the same contribution was due to substantially higher inequality (0.660) but a lower earnings share 
(0.875).  
In Norway two factors played a role in the increase in inequality observed between 1979 and 
2004 -a more dispersed distribution of earnings and a greater contribution of capital income 
inequality- which were partly offset by a reduction in the contribution of self-employment incomes 
(their contribution fell from 0.114 to 0.039). The increase in the contribution of capital income was 
particularly large: it rose by 0.067 points while the SCV of overall income increased by 0.037, and 
this was the result of both a more dispersed distribution of capital income (the SCV of capital 
income rose from 5 to almost 17) and a greater share of this factor in household incomes (3.6% in 
1979 and 6.2% by 2004). As it has been documented,23 the increase in the contribution of capital 
income inequality was largely due to fiscal reforms that took place in the early 1990s. These 
reforms increased the incentives of households to realize capital gains on financial assets and those 
of firms to pay dividends. Note, however, that the LIS data does not include capital gains; hence our 
measure of inequality captures only the impact of the tax reforms through increased dividend 
payments. We are hence probably underestimating the increase in the actual contribution of capital 
income caused by the reform. 
If we compare these two economies with the US and the UK we see that, by the end of the 
period, earnings inequality was of similar magnitude (the SCV of earnings is almost identical in the 
US and Sweden), while the two Scandinavian countries exhibit greater dispersion of capital 
incomes and, in the case of Sweden, much more dispersed self-employment incomes. The major 
                                                 
22 See Gustavsson (2008) on the evolution of the distribution of earnings in Sweden, and Aaberge and Atkinson (2010) 
and Roine and Waldenström (2010) on the evolution of top incomes in the two Scandinavian economies. In particular, 
Gustavsson finds that a substantial fraction of the increase in cross-sectional earnings inequality is due to increased 
transitory earnings fluctuations.  
23 See Aaberge et al. (2000) and Fjærli and Aaberge (2000).   
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difference is that the share of earnings in household income is lower in the Scandinavian than in the 
Anglo-Saxon economies. A surprising feature is that Norway and Sweden do not exhibit a much 
more redistributive tax-transfer component. Its contribution to overall inequality oscillates between 
-0.06 and -0.11, in line with those observed for the UK and the US. 
 
4.2. Relative factor contributions  
A convenient way of examining the sources of changes in inequality is to consider the evolution of 
relative factor contributions. These are captured by the term fs , as given by equation (5), which 
measures the share of inequality that is due to inequality in factor f.  
 Figure 3 depicts the relative factor contributions for the US, Canada and the UK, 
respectively. We can see that in the US earnings are by far the most important source of inequality, 
and that their relative contribution has increased over time, while that of other factors has 
diminished. Canada presents a similar pattern to that observed in the US: a high relative 
contribution of earnings and moderate contributions of capital and self-employment incomes. In the 
UK, there is greater variability in factor contributions over time. The contribution of earnings 
increased over the first decade, fell in the 1980s and increased again in the 1990s, but never reached 
its peak in 1979. The role of capital income also exhibits fluctuations over the period. We can 
observe the increase in its contribution to overall inequality between 1979 and 1991, consistent with 
the result obtained by Jenkins (1995) of a rising contribution of investment income over the period 
1981-86, but its relative contribution fell subsequently. The contribution of self-employment also 
presents substantial variation over the sample period, and has been particularly high since 1991, 
well above those observed in the US and Canada. Jenkins (1995) argues that the “increasing 
incidence of self-employment in the 1980s may also have led to a greater accumulation of assets 
and hence investment income”. Although the data for 1979, 1986 and 1991 seem to support this 
hypothesis, it is not consistent with those for latter years. The data for 1994, 1999, and 2004 exhibit 
an even higher relative contribution of self-employment inequality, accompanied by a reduction in 
the contribution of capital income inequality. An alternative explanation, which would also be 
consistent with the movements of the capital share reported in table 1, is that the pattern in capital 
income is due to the high interest rates of the 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, between 1979 and 
1992 the interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills was between 9 and 15 per cent, and declined 
afterwards, lying between 3.5 and 6.8 percent in the period 1993-2004.  
Figure 4 presents the factor decomposition for the three continental European countries. In 
the case of Germany and Norway we can observe the smaller contribution that earnings inequality 
has compared to the Anglo-Saxon economies. For example, in Norway in 1979 and in 2004, 
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earnings accounted for 89 and 93 per cent of overall inequality, while in the US their contribution 
was 114 and 117 per cent. Both Norway and Sweden experienced a reduction in the contribution of 
self-employment income (since the 1990s in Sweden but throughout the period in Norway), but 
differ in that the former experienced a large increase in the contribution of capital income inequality 
that we do not observe in Sweden.  
 Figure 5 depicts the relative factor contributions for all countries, and illustrates the 
differences across them. The upper panel is for the mid-1980s (the earliest period for which we 
have data for all countries), while the bottom panel reports relative factor contributions in the most 
recent year available, 2004/05. In the top panel, we observe large differences across countries. 
Earnings inequality is most important in the US and Sweden (111% and 137%, respectively) and 
lowest in Germany and Norway (96% and 93%, respectively). The contribution of self-employment 
income ranges from 1% to 38% (Sweden and Germany, respectively) and that of capital income 
from 3% to 15% (Sweden versus the US and Germany, respectively).  A striking feature of the data 
is that there do not seem to be patterns common to the countries within each of the two groups – 
Anglo-Saxon, versus “European”–.  The contribution of earnings is high in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies, but also in Sweden. The two Scandinavian countries exhibit very different 
decompositions, with capital and self-employment income playing a much more important role in 
Norway than in Sweden. Lastly, note that the role of taxes and transfers does not conform with 
common priors, being smallest in Norway, intermediate in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and strongest 
in Germany and Sweden.  
When we do the decomposition for 2004/05 (lower panel of figure 5) we observe the same 
features just described, with the US and Sweden having the largest earnings contribution, and 
Norway the lowest. The first two countries also exhibit a particularly low contribution of self-
employment income (9% and 5%), while for the other countries it ranges between 15 and 33%. The 
most noticeable change is the large increase in the contribution of capital income in the two 
Scandinavian countries, but particularly in Norway, where it went from 6 to 30 per cent.   
 
5. Decomposition by age group  
5.1. The Anglo-Saxon economies  
5.1.1.  Trends in inequality by age 
As we have argued, there are two main reasons why a decomposition by age can help us understand 
the forces that drive inequality changes. First, we have seen that capital income inequality has 
played an important role, and in some cases, such as for Norway, a crucial one in changes in 
inequality. If differences in wealth –and hence in capital income- are mainly due to life-cycle 
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considerations, then the data should show that capital income inequality is largely due to differences 
across age groups and not within age groups. Second, the increase in earnings dispersion has also 
played a central role in inequality changes. A number of authors have shown that, at least in the US 
and the UK, greater wage dispersion has been, partly the result of increased returns to experience. 
This would imply that we should observe an increase in earnings inequality across age groups. A 
further question concerns self-employment. There is evidence that self-employment is more 
frequent amongst mature workers, and this too should be reflected in pattern across age groups.24 
 In order to examine these questions, we decompose the population in each country–year in 
subgroups by age of the household head. We consider 7 subgroups: <25, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-
64, 65-74, >74. Figures 6 and 7 depict the evolution of total disposable income inequality, measured 
by the SCV, for each age subgroup in each of the six countries (to make the figures easier to read, 
we do not depict the two end groups, <25 and >74).  
In general, although not always, inequality is lower for young (25-34) and prime-age 
households (35-54) and higher for older households (55-74). This pattern is clearly present for the 
US and Canada, as can be seen in figure 6. In both countries, the decline in inequality in the 1970s 
was largely driven by lower inequality for older households, while all age groups experienced an 
increase in inequality in the last two decades of the century. As a result, differences in within-group 
inequality were smaller in 2004 than at the start of our sample period. For example, in the US in 
1979 inequality in the 65-74 group was 2.1 times than in the 25-34 group, while this ratio had fallen 
to 1.6 by 2004 (see table 4). Note also that in Canada inequality fell substantially for older 
households (those between 65 and 74 years) in the late 1990s, so that all groups except the 55-64 
years old, had similar degrees of inequality by the end of the period. As we discussed earlier, our 
observation for 2004 indicates a reduction in overall inequality in the US (see table 1). We can see 
that all groups except for the oldest cohorts experienced such a reduction, and it was particularly 
sharp for those in the 55-64 group.  This age group seems to have been affected by a large reduction 
in inequality in self-employment income, for which the absolute contribution was over 0.050 in the 
1990s but had dropped to 0.026 by 2004, a change that could be related to the burst of the dot-com 
bubble. In Canada, overall inequality increased slightly in the first years of the 21st century, but 
different groups had different experiences, with inequality falling for the young and the old and 
increasing for prime–age workers (35-54). 
The UK also exhibits higher inequality for older households. With the exception of the 
oldest cohort, all age groups experienced an increase in inequality from 1979 onwards. Inequality 
for the oldest age-group fluctuates substantially, and the data indicates large changes in the role 
                                                 
24 See, for example, Evans and Leighton (1989). 
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played by the various factors. For example, the contribution of capital income inequality doubled 
between 1979 and 1991 and fell again to its initial value by 2004 (not reported), consistent with the 
hypothesis that interest rates affect the income of this group substantially.   
 
5.1.2. Factor contributions   
We further decompose inequality for each age group by income source. Tables 4 and 5 report the 
absolute contributions of the four factors for the US and the UK in the years 1979 and 2004. 
Looking at the first column for the US, we observe the increase in income inequality for all age 
groups (except the under 25 and over 74) depicted in figure 6, with inequality increasing by 
between 11% (for the over 75) and 91% (for those 35 to 44). The same pattern is observed for 
almost all age groups: the increase in overall inequality was the result of a large increase in earnings 
inequality and a moderate increases in inequality in capital income. For the oldest cohort there was 
also a significant increase in the contribution of taxes-transfers, probably due to a less progressive 
pension system. 
In the UK there is much greater variation across age groups. Inequality increased more than 
twofold for those aged 25-34, almost doubled for the 35-54 age group, but barely changed for 
households above 75. The contribution of earnings inequality rose for all groups except those above 
65. Both the contributions of capital income and self-employment inequality increased for all 
groups. The increase in the contribution of self-employment is particularly large, and is important 
for all age groups. For example, for the 35-44 age group the percentage contribution of this source 
of income to the overall increase was 34%, and it accounted for 59% and 48% of the overall 
increase for the 45-54 and 55-64, respectively. A possible explanation is that the development of IT 
technologies increased entrepreneurship in the UK. 
Table 6 reports absolute factor contributions by age groups for Canada for 1981 and 2004.  
The increase in inequality for those between 25 and 64 reported in figure 6 is driven by an increase 
in earnings and, to a lesser extent, by an increase in self-employment income inequality. 
Meanwhile, the reduction in inequality for older households (over 65 years) was driven by 
reductions in inequality in all three markets incomes, with the contribution of capital income being 
particularly important.  
 
5.2. The continental economies 
5.2.1. Trends in inequality by age  
The evolution of inequality in the continental economies is depicted in figure 7. A common pattern 
for all three countries is that differences across age groups are smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon 
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economies, especially in the Scandinavian economies. Germany exhibits an age-group pattern with 
some fluctuations but no clear trends. A notable difference with other countries is that although 
inequality increased markedly for the older cohorts (those above 45), it rose much less for the 
younger ones.  
In both Norway and Sweden, differences across age groups have remained relatively stable 
over time, and they are much smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon economies. For example, by the end 
of the period the SCV by age group in Sweden ranged between 0.125 and 0.194, implying a much 
smaller gap than that observed in the US (in 2004, the difference between the SVC of the least and 
the most unequal age-groups was 0.136). In Norway, inequality increased for all groups except the 
youngest and the oldest, for which there are substantial fluctuations over the period. Note, 
nevertheless that the two oldest groups experienced a particularly large increase in inequality 
between 1995 and 2004. In Sweden we observe a small increase in inequality for all groups starting 
in 1981. The increase was particularly marked for the eldest cohort over the period 1995-05.  
 
5.2.2. Factor contributions 
The factor decomposition across age groups for inequality in Germany (table 7) indicates a marked 
increase in inequality for the 45-64 group and a much smaller one for those under 45, with 
inequality falling only for those over 65. An increase in the contribution of earnings inequality is 
the driving force for the youngest cohorts. In contrast, those between 45 and 64 experienced an 
increase in the contribution of all three sources of market income. For example, for those in the 55-
64 group, inequality increased by 23 per cent, and the contributions of earnings, self-employment 
income and capital income were, respectively, 16, 13 and 12 per cent, with the increase in market 
income inequality being partially offset by greater redistribution coming from taxes and transfers.  
When we decompose inequality by factor in each group both Sweden and Norway exhibit 
the same main feature: the increase in inequality observed for (virtually) all groups was largely due 
to a higher contribution of earnings inequality for all groups except the oldest two cohorts in 
Norway; see tables 8 and 9. The contribution of self-employment income fell substantially in 
Norway while it rose in Sweden. Both countries experienced an increase in the contribution of 
capital incomes for all age groups (except for the 25-34 year old in Sweden). As we saw earlier, the 
increase in the contribution of capital income inequality was large in Norway, and our 
decomposition by groups indicates that this occurred for all age groups, including the young. The 
contribution of capital income increased about tenfold for those between 35 and 64 and between 
fourfold and six-fold for older households (not reported). The increase in the contribution of capital 
income for young and prime-age households, for whom this source of income was a minor or even 
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negative contribution in 1979, can be due to either an increased ability of younger households to 
accumulate assets or to transfers across generations that result in a perpetuation of wealth 
inequality. For older households the increase in the importance of this source of income is striking. 
The percentage changes in source contribution where 50% for the 65-74 group and 79% for the 
oldest cohort, being the main source of the increase in inequality, which was then offset by 
reductions in the contributions of other market incomes.    
   
5.3. Within-group and between-group inequality  
In order to understand the importance of differences across age groups we compute measures of 
within and between age groups inequality. Recall that we can express the inequality index as the 
sum of the within and between components, either for the aggregate index, i.e. bgwgI += , or for 
each of the factor components, fff bgwgI += . Alternatively, we can compute the contribution of 





f bgwgSI αα . The term wgf the represents within-group inequality in factor f, 
while ff wgα  captures the contribution of within-group inequality in factor f  to overall inequality. 
Similarly bgf  represents between-group inequality in factor f, and ff bgα  is the contribution of 
between-group inequality in factor f  to overall inequality. 
Tables 10 to 13 present a decomposition of within-group and between-group inequality for 
the US, the UK, Norway and Sweden, with the top two panels in each table reporting within and 
between-group inequalities, fwg  and fbg , and the two bottom panels reporting their contributions to 
overall inequality, that is 100*/ Iwg ffα  and 100*/ Ibg ffα .25 
Table 10 shows that in the US within-group inequality accounts for between 86 and 93 per 
cent of overall inequality, while inequality between age groups explains at most 14 percent. 
Throughout the entire period, the fraction of inequality due to between-group differences has declined 
steadily from 14 percent in 1974 to 7 per cent in 2004. Moreover, the absolute contribution of 
between-group inequality fell (from 0.035 to 0.024) implying that all the increase in inequality has 
been due to greater within-group inequality. There are, however, important differences depending on 
the source of income. Between-group inequality accounts for a larger fraction of inequality in 
earnings (between 14 and 22 percent) than it does for self-employment and capital income (about 
1% for self-employment income and between 2 and 4% for capital income).  Moreover, between-
group earnings inequality rose slightly up to 2000, and this could well be the consequence of the 
                                                 
25 We have obtained the results for all countries and available years, and they are available upon request. 
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increase in the returns to experience observed in the US labour market. In contrast, the small 
magnitude of between-group inequality in capital income and the fact that its contribution to overall 
inequality is virtually zero (see bottom panel) implies that lifecycle patterns of saving play a minor 
role in explaining the contribution of wealth inequality to household inequality.    
Table 11 presents the decomposition for Norway, which we compare to that for the US since 
we have observations for both 1979 and 2004 for the two counties, allowing us to compare them 
over the same period. In Norway, the SCV rose from 0.195 to 0.232, a much smaller increase than 
that observed in the US (from 0.218 to 0.319). A salient difference between the two countries is that 
although the levels of between-group inequality are of similar magnitude, within-group inequality is 
much larger in the US. For example, in 2004, between-group inequality was slightly higher in 
Norway (0.039 versus 0.024) while within-group inequality was fifty percent higher in the US 
(0.295 versus 0.194). As a result, between-group inequality accounts for a much larger fraction of 
overall inequality in Norway than in the US, amounting to between 16 and 20%. Similarly, when 
we consider earnings inequality, the between-group component is about one third of total earnings 
inequality in Norway and as low as 15% in the US for 2000 and 2004.  
Table 11 also shows that, as is the case for the US, the cause of the increase in inequality in 
Norway was higher within-group inequality, with inequality between age groups experiencing 
virtually no change. We find increases in within-group inequality for all market incomes. When we 
consider inequality in capital income, both countries exhibit much greater within-group than 
between-group inequality in capital incomes. The latter accounts for at most 4 per cent of the SCV 
of capital incomes, indicating that life-cycle savings are not an important cause of the dispersion in 
this source of income. Moreover, there seem to be no marked differences between the two countries 
in the role of between-age group inequality in capital income despite the fact that Norway has a 
generous public pension system while the US does not.  
The decomposition for the UK is reported in table 12. Between-group inequality was more 
important than in the US at the beginning of the period. It accounted for 22 percent of overall 
inequality in 1979, and declining slightly over the period from 0.045 to 0.033. In contrast, within-
group inequality almost doubled between 1979 and 2004, implying that all the increase in inequality 
observed in the UK is attributable to within-group inequality. The within-group component of 
earnings inequality rose during the period, in line with what we observe in the US, and the between-
group component experienced a moderate increase, rising from 0.122 in 1974 to 0.174 by 2004.  
Lastly, table 13 reports the decomposition for Sweden. As is the case for Norway, the 
between-group component of inequality accounts for a larger fraction of overall and of earnings 
inequality than in the Anglo-Saxon economies. In the case of overall inequality, it was 18% in both 
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1981 and 2005. This stability of the share hides substantial fluctuations over time (not reported), 
with the between-group component ranging between 18 and 31% for the years in our sample. The 
within- and between-groups contributions exhibit very different patterns depending on the factor we 
consider. For earnings and self-employment income the former increased and the latter fell, while 
capital income exhibits a reduction in both within- and between-group inequality.  
 
6. Decomposing earnings inequality 
Tables 14 to 16 report the decomposition of earnings for selected years. As we discussed earlier 
there are three key elements that affect earnings inequality across households: the fraction of 
households with no earnings, the number of earners in a household, and earnings inequality for a 
particular type of earner. We will hence first compute the relative contribution to earnings 
inequality of non-earners and earners, and then divide this second term in the share of inequality 
due to inequality amongst household-heads, amongst spouses, and amongst other earners in the 
household. 
 The first panel of each table gives population proportions. Columns two and three report the 
proportion of households with no earners and with at least one earner, while the next three columns 
report those that have positive household-head earning, positive spouse earnings, and earnings by 
other household members. The second panel reports earnings inequality measures (the SCV) by 
group: the first three columns give inequality amongst all households, amongst non-earners 
(obviously zero) and amongst households with at least one earner, while the next three report for 
each subgroup (head, spouse and other) inequality amongst individuals in that category with 
positive earnings. The last column reports the correlation between the head’s and the spouse’s 
earnings. The bottom panel gives the relative contribution of each group to household earnings 
inequality. It can be read in two ways. On the one hand, columns 2 and 3, which add up to one, give 
the contributions of households with earnings and those without. On the other, columns 2, 4, 5, and 
6 decompose earnings inequality into that due to non-earners, and that due to each type of earner; it 
hence corresponds to decomposing earning inequality into the terms  oshn ssss ,,,   given in equation 
(12) above. 
We start with the decomposition for the US, reported in table 14. For the first year we have 
data on the earnings of the head but not those of the spouse, hence we have grouped the last two 
components together. The data show a relative stability in the share of households not receiving any 
earnings and an upwards trend in the share with spousal earnings, capturing well-established trends 
in female labour force participation. In contrast, the fraction of households where the head had 
positive earnings declined, a trend that could be caused either by an aging population or by shifts 
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towards either self-employment or unemployment.26 Inequality measures, whether for earners, 
heads, or spouses, follow the same trend as overall earnings inequality, increasing up to 2000 and 
falling in 2004. Up to 2000 inequality is substantially higher for spouses than for heads, probably 
reflecting the greater prevalence of part-time employment of women. Inequality is even higher for 
other earners, and again is likely due to part-time or occasional employment for many individual in 
this category such as teenagers or university students with summer jobs. When we look at the 
decomposition of earnings we find a substantial increase in the contribution of earners (from 69 to 
79 percent between 1979 and 2000), which follows closely the patterns in the distribution amongst 
households with positive earnings. The contribution of household heads’ has fallen and that of 
spouses increased over time, reflecting movements in the shares of individuals in each group that 
have positive earnings. The correlation between head and spouses earnings presents a rather 
puzzling patter: the correlation is positive and increasing in the earlier years and negative and 
increasing in magnitude in the latter ones. The evidence is consistent with Burtless (1999) who 
finds an impact on inequality of the increased correlation between the earnings of husband and 
spouse over the period 1979-1996. Our decompositions (not reported) indicate that this correlation 
was high between the mid-80s and the mid-90s (with a value of 0.14 for both 1986 and 1994) but 
started to decline thereafter (with a value of 0.09 in 1997). Again, a possible interpretation is that 
there was a move of household heads towards self-employment, which was facilitated by higher 
female participation and earnings. 
The lower part of table 14 presents the decomposition for the UK. In this case we observe a 
sharp increase in the fraction of non-earners, which increased from 27.6 percent in 1974 to 39.9 
percent by the end of the period, and which was accompanied by a reduction in both the fraction of 
households with positive earnings for the head and for the spouse. As is the case for the US, 
inequality amongst households with positive earnings and amongst the three earners categories went 
up. We had previously seen that by the end of the period earnings inequality was higher in the UK 
than in the US. In contrast when we consider only households with positive earnings, inequality is 
substantially lower in the UK (0.291 in 2004 compared to 0.382 in the US). The reason for this 
difference is the higher and increasing fraction of household without earnings that we observe in the 
UK. Despite the increase in the fraction of non-earners the relative contribution of this group fell 
over the period as higher inequality amongst earners resulted in a more pronounced increase in the 
contribution of the latter (however, the absolute contribution increased for both). The relative 
contribution of both head and spouse grew over the period at the expense of that of other earners. 
                                                 
26 See Autor and Wasserman (2013) on the deteriorating labour market performance of American men. 
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Note also that, after a decline between 1974 and 1979, the correlation between head’s and spouse’s 
earnings increased steadily during the period.  
Canada, table 15, presents patterns close to those in the US. The fraction of non-earners is 
moderate (between 20 and 26 percent) and relatively stable, while there is an upward trend in the 
fraction of spouses with positive earnings. Earnings inequality rose both for households with 
positive earnings and for each category of earners. The increase is similar in magnitude across the 
two countries (e.g. inequality amongst heads doubled between 1979/81 and 2004) but Canada had 
lower initial, and hence end-of period, inequality.  Another similarity is that the relative 
contribution shifted away from non-earners and towards earners. The main difference between the 
two countries is the moderate increase in spousal inequality which rose by 12 percent in Canada and 
by 41 percent in the US between 1979/81 and 2004. As a result the increase in inequality in the 
former was mainly driven by a more dispersed distribution amongst household heads, with their 
relative contribution going from 37 to 52 percent. 
The German data exhibits a large fraction of non-earning households, although their share 
has been relatively stable over the period. This, combined with greater dispersion amongst earners, 
resulted in a reduction in the relative contribution of this group. Note, however, that the relative 
contribution of non-earners was throughout the period much higher than those observed in the US 
or Canada: in Germany it accounted for between 40 and 50 percent of the overall dispersion, while 
in the north-American economies it varied between 20 and 34. This explains the high degree of 
household earnings inequality observed in Germany despite a moderate dispersion of earnings 
amongst earners. The proportional increase in inequality amongst earners is of similar magnitude to 
that observed in the US (around 50 percent in both cases) but the level of inequality is much lower. 
The gap is particularly large for household heads, and at the peak of US inequality (in 2000) the 
SCV for heads was twice as high in that country as in Germany. Patterns for spouses differ from 
those observed in other countries, with inequality amongst spouses falling from 1989 onwards and  
head and spouse earnings being systematically negatively correlated.   
Table 16 reports the data for the Scandinavian economies. Both countries present similar 
patterns and are characterized by greater stability in factor contributions than the other four 
economies. Earnings inequality amongst households is mainly due to inequality amongst earners, 
which accounts for between 60 and 75 percent of inequality throughout the period, in line with what 
we observe in Canada and the US.  Population proportions changed little over the period, although 
in Norway the fraction of spouses with earning grew by 4 percentage points over the period. 
Inequality amongst earners grew by 22 percent in Sweden and by 40 percent in Norway (between 
1979/81 and 2004/05) and in both countries it was driven by a greater dispersion of household head 
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earnings, with the contribution of spousal earnings playing a moderate role. Note also that both 
countries have a positive and large correlation between the head’s and spouse’s earnings, going up 
to 0.39 in the case of Sweden, a correlation well above those observed in the Anglo-Saxon 
economies. This is clearly an important factor in generating substantial dispersion amongst 
households with positive earnings despite moderate degrees of inequality for heads and spouses. 
 
7.  Conclusions  
This paper has examined the contribution of various factors and population sub-groups to changes 
in inequality in 6 industrial countries in the late 20th century and first years of the 21st. A central 
question in our analysis has been to examine to what extent a more dispersed distribution of 
earnings has been responsible for the increase in household income inequality. As has been well 
documented by a large literature, during the 1980s and 1990s inequality in individual earnings rose 
in a number of countries, and it is natural to ask how this higher dispersion affected the distribution 
of household earnings and income. We find that household earnings inequality rose in all countries 
in our sample. Nevertheless, the impact of this increase on household income inequality varied. In 
the UK and the US it was associated with a sharp increase in the contribution of earnings inequality 
to overall inequality, while in Germany and Sweden this contribution barely rose. The reason for 
this was that the continental Europe economies experienced a reduction in the share of earnings in 
total income that offset the impact of increased earnings dispersion. For example, in the US, an 
increase of the SCV of earnings of 41% between the 1974 and 2004 and a stable earnings share 
resulted in an increase in the contribution of this factor of 40%. In contrast, in Sweden earnings 
inequality rose by 30% between 1975 and 2005 but a sharp decline in the share of earnings in 
household incomes implied no change in their contribution to overall inequality. It is interesting to 
note that in the 1950s it was the US that experienced an increase in earnings dispersion that did not 
result in higher income inequality (see Atkinson 2008a,b). 
 The increase in earnings inequality was by far the most important contribution to greater 
income inequality in the US, but this was not the case in all countries. Canada and, especially, the 
UK experienced increases in earnings dispersion but also declines in the share of earnings that 
dampened the contribution of this factor to the increase in inequality. In both countries a higher 
share of self-employment income seems to have been an important force, while the contribution of 
capital income is also important in the UK, particularly up to the mid-1990s. The experience of the 
UK indicates that the forces driving inequality may vary over time, even in the medium term. 
Jenkins (1995) showed that, in the early 1980s, the increase in income dispersion was partly driven 
by an increase in the contributions of self-employment income and income from property, a result 
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that we also obtain over the period 1979-1991. However, over the subsequent 13 years the 
contribution of inequality in property incomes fell (probably due to lower interest rates), and by 
2004 was half of what it had been in 1991. Meanwhile the contribution of inequality in self-
employment income kept growing, and rose from 2 % to almost 9% during the period 1979-2004. 
Germany exhibits little change in overall inequality, yet this stability hides substantial 
changes. Earnings dispersion increased while capital income inequality fell sharply, but since the 
share of the former fell and that of the latter rose, their contributions barely changed.  Earnings 
exhibit a similar pattern in Norway and Sweden, with dispersion increasing but their share falling, 
resulting in a moderate impact on overall inequality. In contrast, increased capital income inequality 
was a major force, particularly in Norway. The time pattern contrasts with our findings for the UK, 
where the contribution of capital income inequality increased and then decreased, roughly in line 
with changes in interest rates. We do not observe such behaviour in the Scandinavian economies, 
where the increase in capital income inequality is likely to have been related to tax changes 
concerning this source of income. 
When we decompose earnings inequality amongst non-earners, household heads and 
spouses, we obtain some surprising results. All countries experienced an increase in household 
earnings inequality but the causes differed. In the US, Canada and the UK it was the result of an 
increase in inequality for all types of earners. The latter country witnessed the largest increase in 
household earnings dispersion, as greater inequality for heads and spouses was accompanied by a 
sharp increase in the number of non-earner households. Germany also witnessed a large increase in 
inequality for all types of earners, but the negative correlation between heads’ and spouses’ 
earnings moderated the rise in household earnings dispersion. In contrast, earnings dispersion in the 
two Scandinavian economies rose moderately for heads and spouses (and fell for the latter in 
Norway) but a positive, large, and rising correlation between the earnings of the two groups implied 
a substantial increase in household earnings inequality. 
  Our decompositions by age groups yield two main conclusions. First, as found in previous 
work, within-group inequality is much greater than inequality between age groups, with the latter 
accounting for between 7 and 28 per cent of overall inequality (these figures are for the US in 2000 
and Sweden in 1975, respectively). When we compare the UK and the US with Norway and 
Sweden we find that the main difference lies in the degree of within group inequality, which is 
much higher in the former, while differences in between-group inequality are small. Nevertheless, 
all countries have in common that the increase in inequality was driven almost exclusively by an 
increase in within-group.  
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Second, we observe different patterns depending on the income source. There is evidence of 
an increase in between-group inequality in earnings, probably reflecting the increase in the returns 
to experience. In contrast, age differences play virtually no role in explaining capital income 
inequality, indicating that life-cycle savings are not the main cause for differences in this source of 
income. Self-employment is in general the most dispersed factor and between-group inequality 
represents a very small fraction of inequality for this type of income. We can, nevertheless, observe 
some changes over the period. In the earlier observations in our sample, self-employment income is 
particularly important amongst middle-aged households; by the end of the period, it made a 
contribution to inequality amongst young households too. This could be capturing the fact that the 
so-called ‘IT revolution’ has been largely driven by small firms setup by young individuals, many 
of which have been phenomenally profitable. 
Our results raise a number of questions for future work.  One is to try to understand why in 
several countries the increase in earnings dispersion was associated with a reduction in the share of 
this factor in total household income. It is possible that there is a causal relation between the two 
that would be worth investigating. The second is a better understanding of the role of self-
employment, which seems to have been a factor of growing importance in the last two decades of 
the century. In particular, we would like to understand whether high inequality in this factor is due 
to dispersion across individuals or to fluctuations over time for a given individual, an analysis that 
requires the use of panel data. From a theoretical point of view, our understanding of the 
determinants of self-employment is limited. Obviously, the decision to be self-employed or work as 
an employee is endogenous and depends both on the return and the variance of income from self-
employment as compared to the wage rate and its variability. If increased dispersion in earnings is 
the result of greater wage uncertainty, it is possible that the increase in dispersion also induced a 
flow of labour from employment into self-employment leading to the changes in the shares of these 
two factors that we have observed in a number of countries. 
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Appendix I:   Data source and descriptive statistics 
 
Factor incomes: Data on incomes are obtained from the Luxemburg Income Study 
(www.lisproject.org, results were obtained between December 2011 and July 2012). In LIS there 
are two files per country/year, a household file and a personal file. Only the former contains 
information on capital income, hence we have focused on household income. The data come from 
different surveys (see below), which have been harmonized by LIS. Table A.1. gives the list of 
countries and years on which we focus.  
 
Earnings: In the LIS household file there is an aggregate variable for wage income (V1 = gross 
wages and salaries). Note that this variable includes the earnings of all household members.  
 
Self employment income: We add farm self-employment income (V4) and non-farm self-
employment income (V5 = Profit/loss from unincorporated enterprises; the income is recorded 
gross of social insurance contributions, but net of expenses). 
 
Capital income : There is an aggregate variable for capital income (V8 = cash property income). It 
includes cash interest, rent, dividends, annuities, private individual pensions, royalties, etc. It 
excludes capital gains, lottery winnings, inheritances, insurance settlements, and all other forms of 
one-off lump sum payments.  
 
Net disposable Income: This variable (DPI) includes gross wages and salaries, cash property 
income, self employment income but also pensions and transfers (both social and private) net of 
mandatory payroll taxes and of income taxes. 
 
Taxes and transfers: We construct this variable as DPI-(V1+V4+V5+V8). It consists of 
occupational pensions, social and private transfers, and non-cash property income, as well as 
income taxes and mandatory payroll taxes.  
 
Top-coding: LIS does not apply bottom- or top-coding to the micro datasets themselves. The LIS 
practice in calculating inequality indices is to top-code the data on gross income at 10 times the 
median of non-equivalised income and to bottom-coded at 1% of equivalised mean income. We 
have chosen not to bottom-code income. The reason for this is that such practice would remove 
negative incomes and we find that a significant number of  household whose main source of income 
is self-employment income report negative incomes. High incomes that are 10 times the median of 
non-equivalised income are dropped from the sample.  
 
Standard errors: We have obtained the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals. These are reported 
below in tables A.2-A.7. The method consists in re-sampling with replacement from the original 
data, which we have done 500 times. Since the original data consists of weighted observations, we 
gave each observation a probability of being drawn equal to its weight in the original sample. The 
number of times that an observation has been drawn is then used as the new weight for that 







Aaberge, R. and A. B. Atkinson, “Top incomes in Norway,” in A. B. Atkinson and T. Piketty  (eds.) 
Top Incomes : A Global Perspective, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010. 
Aaberge, R., A. Bjorklund, M. Jäntti, P.J. Pedersen, N. Smith, and T. Wennemo, “Unemployment 
Shocks and Income Distribution: How Did the Nordic Countries Fare During their Crises?”, 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102, 77—99, 2000. 
Acemoglu, D., “Cross-country Inequality Trends”, The Economic Journal, 113, 121—149, 2003. 
Achdut, L., “Income Inequality, Income Composition and Macroeconomic Trends: Israel, 1979-
93,” Economica, 63(250), S1—S27, 1996. 
Atkinson, A.B., “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold,” The Economic Journal, 107, 297—
321, 1997. 
Atkinson, A.B., “The Long Run Earnings Distribution in Five Countries: "Remarkable Stability," 
U, V, Or W?”, Review of Income and Wealth, 53(1), 1—24, 2007.   
Atkinson, A.B.. The Changing Distribution of Earnings in OECD Countries, The Rodolfo de 
Benedetti lecture Series, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008a. 
Atkinson, A.B., “Distribution and growth in Europe – the empirical picture: a long-run view of the 
distribution of income,” In L. Jonung and J. Kontulaine (eds.) Growth and income 
distribution in an integrated Europe: Does EMU make a difference? European Commission 
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs Publications: Brussels, 2008b. 
Atkinson, A.B. and A. Brandolini, “Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of Secondary Data-Sets: Income 
Inequality in OECD Countries as a Case Study,” Journal of Economic Literature, 39, 771—
799, 2001. 
Atkinson, A.B. and T. Piketty eds., Top Incomes over the Twentieth Century: A Contrast between 
Continental European and English-Speaking Countries, Oxford University  Press, 2007. 
Autor, D. and M. Wasserman, “Wayward sons: The emerging gender gap in labor markets and 
education”, Third Way Report, 20013.  
Björklund, A. and M. Palme, “Income Redistribution Within the Life Cycle versus Between 
Individuals: Empirical Evidence using Swedish Panel Data,” in D. Cohen, T. Piketty, and G. 
Saint-Paul, eds., New Economics of Rising Inequalities, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2001. 
Bourguignon, F., “Decomposable Income Inequality Measures,” Econometrica, 47, 901—920, 
1979. 
Burkhauser, R.V., S. Feng, and S.P. Jenkins, “Using the p90/p10 index to measure U.S. inequality 
trends with current population survey data: A view from inside the Census Bureau vaults,” 
Review of Income and Wealth, 55, 166—185, 2009. 
Burkhauser, R.V., S. Feng, S.P. Jenkins and J. Larrimore, “Estimating trends in US income 
inequality using the Current Population Survey: the importance of controlling for 
censoring,” Journal of Economic Inequality, 9, 393—415, 2011. 
Burtless, G. “Effects of Growing Wage Disparities and Changing Family Composition on the U.S. 
Income Distribution,” European Economic Review, 43, 853—65, 1999. 
Brandolini, A. and G. D’Alessio, “Household Structure and Income Inequality,” in D. del Boca and 
R. G. Repetto (eds.) Women Work, Family and Social Policy in Italy, New York: Peter 
Lang, 2003. 
Brandolini, A. and T. M. Smeeding, “Inequality Patterns in Western Democracies: Cross-Country 
Differences and Changes over Time,” in P. Beramendi and C. J. Anderson (eds.), 
Democracy, Inequality, and Representation, 25—61, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 
2008. 
Brandolini, A. and T.M. Smeeding, “Income Inequality in Richer and OECD Countries,” in 
Salverda, W., B. Nolan, and T. Smeeding (eds.) Oxford Handbook of Economic Inequality, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009. 
 34
Breen, R. and L. Salazar, “Has increased women’s educational attainment led to greater earnings 
inequality in the United Kingdom? A multivariate decomposition analysis,” European 
Sociological Review, 26(2), 143—157, 2010. 
Breen, R. and L. Salazar, “Education Assortative Mating and Earnings Inequality in the United 
States,” American Journal of Sociology, 117(3), 808—843, 2011. 
Checchi, D. and C. García-Peñalosa, “Labour Market Institutions and Income Inequality,” 
Economic Policy, 56, 601 – 649, 2008. 
Checchi, D. and C. García-Peñalosa, “Labour market institutions and the personal distribution of 
income in the OECD,” Economica, 77, 413–450, 2010. 
Cowell, F.A., and S.P. Jenkins, “How much inequality can we explain? A methodology and an 
application to the United States,” The Economic Journal, 105, 421—430, 1995.  
Drescher, J., “Income Inequality Decomposition by Income Source and by Population subgroups: A 
Theoretical Overview and the Empirical Case of Denmark,” LIS Working Paper N°209, 
1999. 
Evans, D.S. and L.S. Leighton, “Some Empirical Aspects of Entrepreneurship,” American 
Economic Review, 79(3), 519—535, 1989.  
Fei, J.C.H., G. Ranis and S.W.Y. Kuo, “Growth and the Family Distribution of Income by factor 
Components,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, 17—53, 1978. 
Fields, G.S., “Income Inequality in Urban Colombia: A Decomposition Analysis,” Review of 
Income and Wealth, 25, 327—341, 1979. 
Fjærli, E. and R. Aaberge, “Tax Reforms, Dividend Policy and Trends in Income Inequality 
Empirical Evidence based on Norwegian Data,” Discussion Papers N° 284, Research 
Department of Statistics Norway, 2000. 
Flückiger, Y. and J. Silber, “Income Inequality Decomposition by Income Source and the 
Breakdown of Inequality Differences Between Two Population Subgroups,” Swiss Journal 
of Economics and Statistics, 131(4), 599—614, 1995. 
Fournier, M., “Inequality decomposition by factor component: a “rank-correlation” approach 
illustrated on the Taiwanese case,” Recherches Économiques de Louvain,  67(4), 381—401, 
2001. 
García-Peñalosa, C. and E. Orgiazzi, “Factor Components of Inequality: A Cross-country Study,” 
Gini Discussion Paper N° 12, 2011. 
Garner T.I., “Consumer expenditures and inequality: an analysis based on decomposition of the 
Gini coefficient,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 75(1), 134—138, 1993.   
Giammatteo, M., “The Bidimensional decomposition of inequality: A nested Theil approach,” LIS 
Working Paper N° 466, 2007. 
Gollin, D. “Getting income shares right,” Journal of Political Economy, 110(2), 458–475, 2002. 
Gottschalk, P. and S. Danziger, “Inequality of wage rates, earnings and family income in the United 
States, 1975-2002,” Review of Income and Wealth, 51, 231—254, 2005.  
Gottschalk, P. and T.M. Smeeding, “Cross-National Comparisons of Earnings and Income 
Inequality,” Journal of Economic Literature, 35, 633—87, 1997. 
Gottschalk, P., “Policy Changes and Growing Earnings Inequality in the US and Six Other OECD 
Countries,” in P. Gottschalk, B. Gustafsson and E. Palmer (eds.), Changing Patterns in the 
Distribution of Economic Welfare. An International Perspective, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
Gustavsson, M., “A New Picture of Swedish Earnings Inequality: Persistent and Transitory 
Components, 1960–1990,” Review of Income and Wealth, 54(3), 324—349, 2008. 
Jäntti, M., “Inequality in Five countries in the 1980s: The Role of Demographic Shifts, Markets and 
Government Policies,” Economica, 64, 415—440, 1997. 
Jäntti, M. and S.P. Jenkins, “The impact of macroeconomic conditions on income inequality,” 
Journal of Economic Inequality, 8, 221—40, 2010. 
 35
Jenkins, S.P., “Accounting for Inequality Trends: Decomposition Analyses for the UK, 1971-86,” 
Economica, 62, 29—63, 1995. 
Jenkins, S.P. “Distributionally sensitive inequality indices and the GB2 income distribution,” 
Review of Income and Wealth, 55, 392—98, 2009. 
Jenkins, S.P. and P. van Kerm, “Accounting for Income Distribution Trends: A Density Function 
Decomposition Approach,” Journal of Economic Inequality, 3, 43—61, 2005. 
Karoly, L. A., “Changes in the Distribution of Individual Earnings in the United States: 1967-
1986”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 74 (1),107—115, 1992. 
Lemieux, T., “The changing nature of wage inequality,” Journal of Population Economics, 21(1), 
21—48, 2008. 
Lerman, R.I. and S. Yitzhaki, “Income Inequality Effects by Income Source: A New Approach and 
Applications to the United States,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 67(1), 151—156, 
1985. 
Machin, S. and J. Van Reenen, “Technology and Changes in Skill Structure: Evidence from Seven 
OECD Countries,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1215—1244, 1998. 
Machin, S., “Wage Inequality in the UK,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 12(1), 47—64, 1996.  
Mookerjee, D. and A.F. Shorrocks, “A decomposition analysis of the trend in UK income 
inequality,” Economic Journal, 92, 886—992, 1982. 
Mussard, S., “The bidimensional decomposition of the Gini index. A case study: Italy,” Applied 
Economics Letters, 11, 503—05, 2004. 
Nolan, B., “Cyclical fluctuations in factor shares and the size distribution of income,” Review of 
Income and Wealth 33, 193—210, 1987. 
Parker, S., “The Inequality of Employment and Self-Employment Incomes: A Decomposition 
Analysis for the UK,” Review of Income and Wealth, 45(2), 263—274, 1999. 
Piketty, T. and E. Saez, “Income inequality in the United States, 1913-1998 ,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 118(1), 1—39, 2003. 
Podder, N., “The Disaggregation of the Gini Coefficient by Factor Components and its Applications 
to Australia,” Review of Income and Wealth, 39, 51—61, 1993. 
Pyatt, G., C. Chen and J. Fei, “The Distribution of Income by Factor Components,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 95, 451—74, 1980.  
Rao, V.M., “Two Decompositions of Concentration Ratio,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 
Series A 132, 418—425, 1969. 
Roine, J. and D. Waldenström, “Top Incomes in Sweden over the twentieth century,” in A. B. 
Atkinson, Thomas Piketty  (eds.) Top Incomes : A Global Perspective, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2010. 
Shorrocks, A. F., “Inequality Decomposition by Factor Components”, Econometrica 50, 193—211, 
1982. 
Shorrocks, A. F., “The impact of factor components on the distribution of family incomes,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 98, 311—326, 1983. 
Shorrocks, A. F., “The Age-Wealth Relationship: A Cross-Section and Cohort Analysis,” The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 57(2), 155—63, 1975. 
van den Noord, P. and C. Heady, “Surveillance of Tax Policies: A Synthesis of Findings in 


















1974 0.256 0.473 12.732 9.417 9.184 
1979 0.218 0.466 10.790 6.537 8.997 
1991 0.246 0.535 11.406 6.534 20.938 
2000 0.352 0.711 16.929 6.552 10.527 
2004 0.319 0.668 14.846 8.044 38.745 
Absolute 
contribution 
1974  0.267 0.057 0.027 -0.095 
1979  0.249 0.031 0.025 -0.086 
1991  0.265 0.027 0.043 -0.089 
2000  0.420 0.046 0.035 -0.149 
2004  0.373 0.030 0.033 -0.116 






















































% changes in source 
contribution 
1974-91 -3.8 -0.6 -11.8 6.3 2.3 









1974 0.201 0.422 9.589 9.887 1,526.48 
1979 0.204 0.488 11.514 8.891 21,969.07
1991 0.292 0.752 11.120 6.169 95.803 
1999 0.332 0.805 11.493 9.151 200.557 







1974  0.196 0.047 0.014 -0.057 
1979  0.240 0.021 0.009 -0.066 
1991  0.296 0.071 0.041 -0.115 
1999  0.315 0.075 0.025 -0.083 
2004  0.318 0.086 0.020 -0.098 
 

















































% changes in source 
contribution 
1974-91 -2.8 6.7 -6.3 1.9 -5.1 
1991-04 8.4 -2.7 3.3 1.1 6.7 
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1975 0.228 0.422 17.401 5.708 41.543 
1981 0.205 0.399 13.862 4.137 29.509 
1991 0.216 0.511 13.487 5.821 442.291 
2000 0.252 0.623 12.873 9.301 130.705 
2004 0.265 0.651 13.218 13.191 749.729 
Absolute 
contribution 
1975  0.243 0.034 0.014 -0.063 
1981  0.208 0.028 0.029 -0.059 
1991  0.243 0.034 0.021 -0.082 
2000  0.291 0.045 0.015 -0.101 
2004  0.288 0.049 0.022 -0.094 






















































% changes in 
source 
contribution 
1975-91 -5.4 0.0 -0.1 3.0 -8.3 







1984 0.208 0.565 11.435 9.994 62.865 
1989 0.201 0.571 11.191 14.881 32.207 
2000 0.205 0.638 10.065 7.364 87.162 





1984  0.199 0.079 0.029 -0.099 
1989  0.212 0.066 0.033 -0.110 
2000  0.189 0.084 0.035 -0.104 
2004  0.207 0.073 0.035 -0.096 
 













































% changes in 
source 
contribution 
1984-89 -2.8 6.7 -6.3 1.9 -5.1 
1989-04 8.4 -2.7 3.3 1.1 6.7 
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1979 0.195 0.478 9.662 5.140 9.703 
1991 0.205 0.522 7.627 4.592 104.624 
2000 0.227 0.537 10.597 13.014 82.719 
2004 0.232 0.564 12.171 16.858 474.661 
Absolute 
contribution 
1979  0.173 0.114 0.003 -0.095 
1991  0.212 0.050 0.028 -0.086 
2000  0.231 0.044 0.052 -0.101 
2004  0.215 0.039 0.070 -0.091 












































% changes in 
source 
contribution 
1979-91 5.1 20.4 -32.7 13.0 4.4 







1975 0.164 0.508 13.400 3.739 12.116 
1981 0.203 0.555 12.054 52.249 6646.517 
1992 0.202 0.628 110.189 3.099 11.886 
2000 0.214 0.665 24.873 10.383 28949.885







1975  0.251 0.005 0.004 -0.095 
1981  0.204 -0.001 0.063 -0.062 
1992  0.225 0.023 0.016 -0.062 
2000  0.284 0.014 0.030 -0.114 


























































% changes in 
source 
contribution 
1975-92 22.8 -15.8 11.0 7.3 20.3 
1992-05 -6.0 15.1 -6.8 2.3 -16.6 
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Table 4 – Inequality by age: US 
Overall inequality, absolute factor contributions and % changes in source contribution 








1979 0.220 0.253 0.017 0.011 -0.061 
2004 0.317 0.344 0.018 0.010 -0.055 
% changes 43.9 41.5 0.4 -0.4 2.5 
25-34 
 
1979 0.141 0.180 0.016 0.006 -0.061 
2004 0.233 0.298 0.015 0.009 -0.089 
% changes 65.5 83.7 -0.9 2.4 -19.6 
35-44 
 
1979 0.141 0.166 0.020 0.010 -0.056 
2004 0.269 0.330 0.027 0.018 -0.107 
% changes 91.0 116.7 4.9 5.6 -36.2 
45-54 
 
1979 0.169 0.191 0.022 0.018 -0.062 
2004 0.276 0.331 0.027 0.024 -0.106 
% changes 63.7 83.4 2.8 3.5 -25.9 
55-64 
 
1979 0.237 0.250 0.042 0.045 -0.100 
2004 0.304 0.339 0.026 0.043 -0.104 
% changes 28.5 37.8 -6.8 -0.8 -1.7 
65-74 
 
1979 0.296 0.165 0.038 0.098 -0.005 
2004 0.369 0.247 0.042 0.101 -0.021 
% changes 24.7 27.6 1.4 1.0 -5.2 
>74 
 
1979 0.328 0.125 0.030 0.128 0.045 
2004 0.365 0.125 0.026 0.140 0.075 
% changes 11.3 -0.1 -1.4 3.6 9.2 
 
Table 5  – Inequality by age: UK 
Overall inequality, absolute factor contributions and % changes in source contribution 








1979 0.125 0.145 0.006 0.001 -0.026 
2004 0.208 0.231 0.026 0.002 -0.050 
% changes 66.4 68.7 16.1 1.2 -19.5 
25-34 
 
1979 0.099 0.110 0.013 0.002 -0.025 
2004 0.234 0.267 0.045 0.005 -0.082 
% changes 136.5 158.8 32.5 3.3 -58.1 
35-44 
 
1979 0.131 0.135 0.025 0.004 -0.032 
2004 0.254 0.256 0.070 0.009 -0.080 
% changes 94.1 92.3 34.2 3.7 -36.1 
45-54 
 
1979 0.141 0.156 0.010 0.005 -0.030 
2004 0.270 0.237 0.093 0.011 -0.070 
% changes 92.0 57.2 58.7 4.3 -28.2 
55-64 
 
1979 0.210 0.237 0.008 0.023 -0.057 
2004 0.367 0.286 0.108 0.049 -0.076 
% changes 74.5 23.1 47.6 12.5 -8.7 
65-74 
 
1979 0.255 0.186 0.020 0.062 -0.013 
2004 0.312 0.124 0.057 0.069 0.062 
% changes 22.5 -24.2 14.7 2.7 29.3 
>74 
 
1979 0.242 0.183 0.002 0.049 0.008 
2004 0.252 0.045 0.015 0.085 0.106 




Table 6  – Inequality by age: Canada 
Overall inequality, absolute factor contributions and % changes in source contribution 








1981 0.207 0.236 0.014 0.005 -0.048 
2004 0.322 0.329 0.056 0.006 -0.070 
% changes 55.7 44.8 20.7 0.6 -10.5 
25-34 
 
1981 0.131 0.142 0.017 0.011 -0.040 
2004 0.179 0.209 0.019 0.003 -0.054 
% changes 36.7 51.9 1.5 -6.1 -10.6 
35-44 
 
1981 0.138 0.131 0.027 0.019 -0.039 
2004 0.216 0.243 0.051 0.012 -0.089 
% changes 57.1 81.1 17.4 -5.2 -36.2 
45-54 
 
1981 0.162 0.162 0.027 0.019 -0.047 
2004 0.257 0.288 0.050 0.020 -0.102 
% changes 59.1 78.1 14.1 0.6 -33.6 
55-64 
 
1981 0.210 0.205 0.022 0.035 -0.052 
2004 0.287 0.258 0.060 0.037 -0.068 
% changes 36.5 25.4 17.7 0.9 -7.5 
65-74 
 
1981 0.275 0.158 0.022 0.104 -0.009 
2004 0.191 0.060 0.020 0.055 0.056 
% changes -30.5 -35.7 -0.9 -17.7 23.8 
>74 
 
1981 0.301 0.074 0.027 0.247 -0.048 
2004 0.215 0.021 0.007 0.078 0.109 
% changes -28.5 -17.6 -6.6 -56.4 52.0 
 
Table 7 – Inequality by age: Germany 
Overall inequality, absolute factor contributions and % changes in source contribution 








1984 0.205 0.315 0.000 0.005 -0.114 
2004 0.207 0.283 0.001 0.004 -0.082 
% changes 1.0 -15.2 0.6 -0.3 15.9 
25-34 
 
1984 0.143 0.127 0.072 0.023 -0.079 
2004 0.155 0.189 0.042 0.013 -0.089 
% changes 8.8 43.5 -21.0 -6.8 -6.8 
35-44 
 
1984 0.129 0.104 0.087 0.014 -0.076 
2004 0.145 0.141 0.058 0.019 -0.074 
% changes 12.1 28.9 -22.7 4.3 1.6 
45-54 
 
1984 0.142 0.126 0.058 0.022 -0.064 
2004 0.197 0.199 0.074 0.029 -0.105 
% changes 38.1 51.1 11.6 4.8 -29.4 
55-64 
 
1984 0.189 0.173 0.065 0.026 -0.075 
2004 0.233 0.203 0.090 0.048 -0.109 
% changes 23.4 16.2 13.4 11.9 -18.0 
65-74 
 
1984 0.245 0.067 0.033 0.083 0.062 
2004 0.230 0.060 0.062 0.051 0.057 
% changes -6.1 -2.9 11.8 -13.1 -1.9 
>74 
 
1984 0.265 0.045 0.076 0.045 0.099 
2004 0.194 0.021 0.011 0.063 0.099 
% changes -27.0 -8.9 -24.6 6.5 0.1 
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Table 8 – Inequality by age: Norway 
Overall inequality, absolute factor contributions and % changes in source contribution 








1979 0.262 0.156 0.156 -0.003 -0.048 
2004 0.363 0.322 0.000 0.102 -0.062 
% changes 38.7 63.4 -59.6 40.1 -5.3 
25-34 
 
1979 0.208 0.071 0.197 -0.015 -0.046 
2004 0.158 0.175 0.013 0.020 -0.051 
% changes -24.1 50.0 -88.6 17.0 -2.5 
35-44 
 
1979 0.091 0.076 0.050 0.004 -0.039 
2004 0.152 0.150 0.018 0.044 -0.060 
% changes 66.3 80.4 -34.7 43.4 -22.7 
45-54 
 
1979 0.110 0.102 0.061 0.006 -0.059 
2004 0.174 0.154 0.040 0.056 -0.076 
% changes 58.7 47.8 -19.8 45.4 -14.8 
55-64 
 
1979 0.144 0.139 0.082 0.008 -0.084 
2004 0.196 0.145 0.049 0.083 -0.080 
% changes 35.9 4.3 -22.5 51.7 2.4 
65-74 
 
1979 0.182 0.143 0.077 0.019 -0.058 
2004 0.213 0.096 0.017 0.110 -0.010 
% changes 16.9 -25.9 -33.2 49.9 26.0 
>74 
 
1979 0.178 0.028 0.039 0.040 0.071 
2004 0.277 0.026 0.017 0.181 0.053 
% changes 56.1 -1.0 -12.6 79.3 -9.7 
 
 
Table 9 – Inequality by age: Sweden 
Overall inequality, absolute factor contributions and % changes in source contribution 








1981 0.129 0.137 0.000 -0.001 -0.007 
2005 0.141 0.173 0.004 0.000 -0.036 
% changes 9.5 27.9 3.3 1.0 -22.7 
25-34 
 
1981 0.112 0.107 -0.004 0.275 -0.005 
2005 0.130 0.166 0.006 0.007 -0.048 
% changes 16.3 52.6 9.2 -239.3 -38.1 
35-44 
 
1981 0.098 0.135 -0.007 0.004 -0.034 
2005 0.125 0.185 0.002 0.008 -0.070 
% changes 28.0 51.2 9.3 4.4 -37.0 
45-54 
 
1981 0.109 0.165 -0.007 0.003 -0.053 
2005 0.150 0.215 0.007 0.014 -0.085 
% changes 38.0 46.0 12.5 9.5 -30.0 
55-64 
 
1981 0.099 0.163 -0.011 0.002 -0.055 
2005 0.156 0.210 0.007 0.023 -0.083 
% changes 58.5 47.4 17.8 21.0 -27.7 
65-74 
 
1981 0.077 0.040 0.001 0.009 0.027 
2005 0.194 0.095 0.026 0.060 0.014 
% changes 153.1 72.3 32.0 66.6 -17.8 
>74 
 
1981 0.063 0.003 0.001 0.017 0.042 
2005 0.137 0.013 0.005 0.064 0.055 
% changes 118.3 16.4 6.6 75.2 20.1 
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1974 0.221 0.373 12.592 9.166 7.197 
1979 0.190 0.364 10.663 6.267 7.004 
1991 0.223 0.420 11.269 6.276 15.871 
2000 0.328 0.608 16.832 6.390 8.582 
2004 0.295 0.569 14.753 7.894 30.908 
Between-group Inequality 
1974 0.035 0.099 0.140 0.252 1.987 
1979 0.028 0.101 0.126 0.269 1.993 
1991 0.023 0.115 0.137 0.257 5.066 
2000 0.024 0.103 0.097 0.162 1.945 
2004 0.024 0.099 0.093 0.150 7.837 
% Contribution of Within-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1974 86.3 82.5 21.9 10.3 -29.1 
1979 87.1 89.1 13.9 10.8 -30.6 
1991 90.5 84.8 10.7 16.8 -27.5 
2000 93.2 102.1 13.0 9.8 -34.7 
2004 92.6 99.5 9.3 10.0 -29.0 
% Contribution of Between-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1974 13.7 22.0 0.2 0.3 -8.0 
1979 12.9 24.8 0.2 0.5 -8.7 
1991 9.5 23.2 0.1 0.7 -8.8 
2000 6.8 17.3 0.1 0.2 -7.9 




Table 11 – Inequality within and between age groups: Norway 
 








1979 0.157 0.330 9.519 5.046 6.415
2004 0.194 0.413 11.927 16.744 341.293
Between-group Inequality 
1979 0.037 0.149 0.142 0.095 3.289
2004 0.039 0.151 0.244 0.114 133.368
% Contribution of Within-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1979 80.7 61.2 57.6 1.3 -32.1
2004 83.4 67.8 16.3 29.9 -28.2
% Contribution of Between-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1979 19.3 27.6 0.9 0.0 -16.5




















1974 0.161 0.300 9.450 9.724 15964.569
1979 0.159 0.340 11.300 8.737 15964.569
1991 0.253 0.571 10.934 5.989 70.411 
2000 0.295 0.626 11.309 8.992 156.965 
2004 0.294 0.642 10.492 9.541 112.732 
Between-group Inequality 
1974 0.039 0.122 0.139 0.162 483.644 
1979 0.045 0.148 0.215 0.154 6004.498 
1991 0.039 0.180 0.187 0.180 25.393 
2000 0.037 0.180 0.184 0.159 43.592 
2004 0.033 0.174 0.154 0.228 40.777 
% Contribution of Within-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1974 80.4 69.6 22.9 7.1 -19.3 
1979 77.9 81.8 10.2 4.4 -23.4 
1991 86.7 76.9 23.8 13.7 -29.0 
2000 88.8 73.7 22.3 7.3 -19.5 
2004 89.9 76.6 26.0 6.1 -22.0 
% Contribution of Between-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1974 19.6 28.2 0.3 0.1 -9.0 
1979 22.1 35.6 0.2 0.1 -8.8 
1991 13.3 24.3 0.4 0.4 -10.5 
2000 11.2 21.1 0.4 0.1 -5.4 















1981 0.167 0.356 11.786 51.617 4507.574
2005 0.155 0.488 20.198 9.805 47.653
Between-group Inequality 
 
1981 0.036 0.199 0.268 0.632 2138.943
2005 0.034 0.172 0.168 0.265 16.907
% Contribution of Within-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1981 82.2 64.5 -0.7 30.6 -20.8
2005 81.8 99.5 5.0 10.4 -37.0
% Contribution of Between-group 
Inequality to overall Inequality 
1981 17.8 36.0 0.0 0.4 -9.9
2005 18.2 35.0 0.0 0.3 -13.1
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group in the 
population 
 
1974 1 0.220 0.780 0.707 0.435  
1979 1 0.224 0.776 0.699 0.291 0.213  
1991 1 0.250 0.750 0.662 0.348 0.202  
2000 1 0.228 0.772 0.663 0.375 0.194  





1974 0.473 0 0.259 0.248 0.433 . 
1979 0.466 0 0.250 0.232 0.330 0.580 0.075 
1991 0.535 0 0.277 0.268 0.318 0.577 0.140 
2000 0.711 0 0.435 0.560 0.623 0.629 -0.016 






1974 1 0.298 0.702 0.517 0.186  
1979 1 0.309 0.691 0.485 0.123 0.083  
1991 1 0.311 0.689 0.453 0.175 0.062  
2000 1 0.207 0.793 0.457 0.295 0.041  





















group in the 
population 
 
1974 1 0.276 0.724 0.634 0.326 0.192  
1979 1 0.318 0.682 0.593 0.317 0.168  
1991 1 0.410 0.590 0.476 0.313 0.204  
1999 1 0.413 0.587 0.477 0.308 0.203  





1974 0.422 0 0.167 0.147 0.231 0.253 0.110 
1979 0.488 0 0.174 0.140 0.253 0.223 0.078 
1991 0.752 0 0.239 0.201 0.289 0.743 0.087 
1999 0.805 0 0.266 0.246 0.301 0.654 0.111 






1974 1 0.453 0.547 0.370 0.085 0.093  
1979 1 0.478 0.522 0.318 0.092 0.112  
1991 1 0.461 0.539 0.372 0.107 0.060  
1999 1 0.437 0.563 0.374 0.134 0.054  
2004 1 0.407 0.593 0.408 0.145 0.040  
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group in the 
population 
 
1975 1 0.214 0.786 . . .  
1981 1 0.213 0.787 0.650 0.293 0.271  
1991 1 0.245 0.755 0.659 0.351 0.225  
2000 1 0.261 0.739 0.687 0.323 0.209  





1975 0.422 0 0.225 . . . . 
1981 0.399 0 0.208 0.170 0.283 0.553 0.186 
1991 0.511 0 0.264 0.254 0.287 0.540 0.165 
2000 0.623 0 0.330 0.316 0.285 0.518 0.290 






1975 1 0.322 0.678 . . .  
1981 1 0.339 0.661 0.371 0.151 0.140  
1991 1 0.317 0.683 0.426 0.172 0.085  
2000 1 0.283 0.717 0.503 0.149 0.064  





















group in the 
population 
 
1984 1 0.362 0.638 0.557 0.245 0.199  
1989 1 0.347 0.653 0.567 0.283 0.206  
2000 1 0.343 0.657 0.562 0.320 0.175  





1984 0.565 0 0.179 0.156 0.241 0.793 -0.018 
1989 0.571 0 0.199 0.179 0.411 0.749 -0.077 
2000 0.638 0 0.247 0.247 0.288 1.208 -0.038 





1984 1 0.502 0.498 0.345 0.098 0.055  
1989 1 0.466 0.534 0.320 0.158 0.056  
2000 1 0.410 0.590 0.375 0.186 0.029  
2004 1 0.392 0.608 0.375 0.214 0.019  
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group in the 
population 
 
1979 1 0.271 0.729 0.682 0.336 0.123  
1991 1 0.254 0.746 0.677 0.318 0.212  
2000 1 0.258 0.742 0.677 0.362 0.141  





1979 0.478 0 0.213 0.192 0.299 0.976 0.227 
1991 0.522 0 0.262 0.246 0.189 0.488 0.202 
2000 0.537 0 0.270 0.259 0.168 0.642 0.224 





1979 1 0.388 0.612 0.421 0.160 0.031  
1991 1 0.326 0.674 0.423 0.169 0.082  
2000 1 0.324 0.676 0.430 0.196 0.050  





















group in the 
population 
 
1975 1 0.255 0.745 0.716 0.313 0.042  
1981 1 0.277 0.723 0.683 0.314 0.112  
1992 1 0.282 0.718 0.681 0.315 0.040  
2000 1 0.298 0.702 0.663 0.314 0.098  





1975 0.508 0 0.251 0.218 0.246 0.610 0.238 
1981 0.555 0 0.262 0.216 0.190 1.328 0.278 
1992 0.628 0 0.310 0.264 0.178 0.827 0.330 
2000 0.665 0 0.318 0.275 0.204 0.882 0.354 






1975 1 0.337 0.663 0.465 0.192 0.005  
1981 1 0.346 0.654 0.434 0.216 0.004  
1992 1 0.312 0.688 0.448 0.238 0.002  
2000 1 0.319 0.681 0.447 0.212 0.022  








































































































































































































Figure 6– Income Inequality by Age Group: US, Canada and UK 
 
 



















Table A.1 – Luxemburg income study surveys 
 
 
Country Years Survey 
Canada 1971, 1975, 1981, 1987, 
1991, 1994, 1997, 1998 
Survey of Consumer Finances  
 
2000, 2004 Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics 
Germany 1984, 1989, 1994, 2000, 
2004 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)  
Das Sozio-oekonomischePane) 
(Datasets earlier than 1994 refer to the former West-
Germany, latter ones refer to unified Germany) 
Norway 1979, 1986, 1991, 1995, 
2000, 2004 
Income Distribution Survey  
Inntekts- og Formuesundersokelsen husholdninger 
 
Sweden 1975, 1981, 1987, 1992, 
1995, 2000, 2005 
Income Distribution Survey 
Inkomstfördelningsundersökningen 
UK 1969, 1974, 1979, 1986, 
1991 
Family Expenditure Survey 
1994, 1999, 2004 Family Resources Survey 
US 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 
1994, 1997, 2000, 2004 








  1974 1979 1991 2000 2004 
Inequality 
(HSCV) 
Mean 0.256 0.218 0.246 0.352 0.319 
Stand. 








Mean 0.267 0.249 0.266 0.419 0.373 
Stand. 








Mean 0.057 0.031 0.027 0.046 0.030 
Stand. 








Mean 0.027 0.025 0.043 0.035 0.033 
Stand. 









Mean -0.095 -0.086 -0.089 -0.149 -0.116 
Stand. 

















Table A.3  – Bootstrapped results: UK 
 
 
  1974 1979 1991 1999 2004 
Inequality 
(HSCV) 
Mean 0.201 0.204 0.292 0.332 0.327 
Stand. 








Mean 0.196 0.240 0.296 0.315 0.318 
Stand. 








Mean 0.047 0.021 0.071 0.075 0.086 
Stand. 








Mean 0.014 0.009 0.041 0.025 0.020 
Stand. 










Mean -0.056 -0.066 -0.115 -0.082 -0.098 
Stand. 
















Table A.4 – Bootstrapped results: Canada 
 
 
  1975 1981 1991 2000 2004 
Inequality 
(HSCV) 
Mean 0.228 0.205 0.216 0.252 0.265 
Stand. 








Mean 0.243 0.208 0.243 0.291 0.288 
Stand. 








Mean 0.034 0.029 0.034 0.045 0.049 
Stand. 








Mean 0.014 0.029 0.021 0.015 0.022 
Stand. 









Mean -0.063 -0.059 -0.082 -0.101 -0.094 
Stand. 

















Table A.5 – Bootstrapped results: Germany 
 
 
  1984 1989 2000 2004 
Inequality 
(HSCV) 
Mean 0.208 0.201 0.205 0.218 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0003 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.207;0.208] [0.200;0.202] [0.204;0.205] [0.218;0.219] 
Abs. Contr. 
Earnings 
Mean 0.199 0.212 0.189 0.207 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0003 0.0005 0.0002 0.0003 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.198;0.200] [0.211;0.213] [0.188;0.189] [0.207;0.208] 
Abs. Contr.  
Self-Emp 
Mean 0.079 0.066 0.084 0.073 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.078;0.080] [0.065;0.067] [0.084;0.085] [0.072;0.073] 
Abs. Contr.  
Capital 
Mean 0.029 0.033 0.035 0.035 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0002 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.028;0.029] [0.032;0.033] [0.035;0.036] [0.034;0.035] 
Abs. Contr.  
Taxes & 
trans 
Mean -0.099 -0.110 -0.104 -0.096 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
95% Conf. 










Table A.6 – Bootstrapped results: Norway 
 
 
  1979 1991 2000 2004 
Inequality 
(HSCV) 
Mean 0.195 0.205 0.227 0.232 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0012 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.192;0.197] [0.204;0.205] [0.226;0.228] [0.232;0.233] 
Abs. Contr. 
Earnings 
Mean 0.173 0.212 0.231 0.215 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.172;0.173] [0.212;0.213] [0.231;0.232] [0.214;0.216] 
Abs. Contr.  
Self-Emp 
Mean 0.114 0.050 0.044 0.039 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0017 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.111;0.118] [0.050;0.051] [0.044;0.045] [0.038;0.039] 
Abs. Contr.  
Capital 
Mean 0.003 0.028 0.052 0.070 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
95% Conf. 
Interv. [0.002;0.003] [0.027;0.028] [0.052;0.053] [0.069;0.071] 
Abs. Contr.  
Taxes & trans 
Mean -0.094 -0.086 -0.101 -0.091 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
95% Conf. 






TableA.7 – Bootstrapped results: Sweden 
 
 




Mean 0.164 0.204 0.203 0.214 0.190 
Stand. 









Mean 0.251 0.204 0.225 0.284 0.255 
Stand. 









Mean 0.005 -0.001 0.024 0.014 0.010 
Stand. 









Mean 0.004 0.064 0.016 0.030 0.020 
Stand. 










Mean -0.095 -0.062 -0.062 -0.114 -0.095 
Stand. 
Deviation 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
95% 
Conf. 
Interv. 
[-0.094; 
-0.095] 
[-0.063; 
-0.062] 
[-0.062; 
-0.062] 
[-0.114; 
-0.113] 
[-0.095; 
-0.095] 
 
